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CHAPTER ONE:  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND AND OUTLINE OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
Participating in trade and accessing the markets of developed countries, in particular, has been 
of the utmost importance for developing countries. The General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) set the platform for trade policies to ensure this. The idea of governing 
international trade started with the formation of the International Trade Organisation (ITO), 
which was established with the intention of working in conformity with the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF).1 While the World Bank and the IMF were fully 
established, the ITO failed at encouraging free trade between nations, and it imposed a 
fundamentally flawed developmental model.2 The GATT was therefore consequently 
established to fill the gaps left behind by the ITO. The GATT is an agreement rather than an 
organisation which dealt specifically with trade in goods and the reduction of trade tariffs 
internationally to help create a free trade environment.3 So one of the main objectives of GATT 
was to assist nations to discuss and agree on international trade activities. 
After years of rounds of negotiations, the formation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
was intended to address those issues that the GATT was unable to address. The WTO has a 
central purpose to provide a ‘forum for negotiating agreements aimed at reducing obstacles to 
international trade’.4 Free trade and growth in trade has the greatest potential to eradicate 
poverty and promote development. Moreover, Hoekman suggests that the more countries 
liberalise trade, the more they benefit in terms of economic growth and development.5 This is 
essentially the argument preferred  by the WTO as its central purpose is to open trade for the 
aid of all and deal with the rules of trade between states at an international level.6 Essentially, 
                                                          
1 M Trebilcock & R Howse The Regulation of International Trade Routledge. (2005) 23. 
2 Top Ten Reasons to Oppose the IMF. Available on 
http://www.globalexchange.org/sites/default/files/IMFTopTen.pdf (Accessed 20 March 2016. 
3 Development: Trade and Development Committee. Special and Differential Treatment Provisions. Available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/dev_special_diferential_provisions_e.htm (Accessed 12 February 
2012). 
4 R Wilkinson Whats Wrong with The WTO and How To Fix It. Cambridge: Polity (2014) 9. 
5 B Hoekman More Favourable and Differential Treatment of Developing Countries: Towards A New Approach 
in the World Trade Organization World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3107 (2003) 1. 
6 What is the WTO? Available at https://ww.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatois_e.htm (Accessed 
1 February 2017). 
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the WTO provides for its members a means to discuss trade agreements and deal with trade 
problems. According to Dugard, the object of this particular institution is to ‘provide the 
common institutional framework for the conduct of trade relations among its members in 
matters relating to the agreements and associated legal instruments included in the annexes to 
this agreement’.7 
In addition, the principles of the WTO include lengthy and complex agreements which cover a 
variety of activities ranging from ‘agriculture, textiles and clothing to banking, government 
purchases, intellectual property and much more’.8 The foundation of the multilateral trading 
system therefore results from the principles of various agreements under the WTO.9 The WTO 
embodies a principle that requires equal treatment of all and to promote trade without 
discrimination. These principles are referred to as the Most Favoured Nation and the National 
Treatment Principle, both of which are provisions of the GATT.10 They generally apply 
whenever member states are trading with each other. However, developing countries are 
sometimes exempt from compliance with these principles, which is commonly known as the 
Generalised System of Preferences (GSPs). The GSP has been criticised as it is a purely 
voluntary initiative and it applies the discretion of developed countries.11 GSP was, however, 
a clear deviation from Article I of the GATT, which prohibits discrimination; and in order for 
compliance with GSP to occur, it was imperative to waive Article 1 of the GATT (as stated 
earlier). 
Furthermore, the important objectives of the WTO are to implement and promote a new world 
trade system in a manner that benefits every country; to ensure that developing countries can 
enjoy the advantages of the world trade system as international trade expands; to increase the 
transparency and decision-making processes; to resolve trade disputes; to provide a forum for 
negotiating and monitoring further trade liberalisation; and to cooperate with other major 
international economic institutions involved with global economic management.12 As such, 
these objectives aim to further the major aim of the WTO. which is to reduce and/or remove 
barriers on trade. It achieves this by holding a series of negotiations known as ‘rounds’ (as with 
                                                          
7 J Dugard International Law. 4th Edition. Juta & Co Ltd (2011) 445. 
8 S Lester et al World Trade Law: Text, Materials and Commentary. Emerald Group Publishing Ltd (2012) 9. 
9 Ibid. 
10 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947. 
11 Lichtenbaum “Special Treatment” versus “Equal Participation”: Striking a balance in the Doha negotiations’ 
2002 (17) American University International Law Review (Am. U. Int’l L. Rev.) 1015. 
12Article XXXVI Principles and objectives of WTO. Available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/gatt_ai_e/art36_e.pdf (Accessed 29 January 2017). 
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the GATT) in which most member states participate. It is within this context, and finding a 
means to address the needs of developing countries (which comprise the majority of the WTO 
members) that the Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) principle evolved through the Pre- 
and Post-Uruguay Round. The significance of the Post-Uruguay Round on SDT provisions was 
that the agreements explicitly specify to what extent developing countries as well as developed 
countries should meet their obligations.13 
Since addressing the lack of development has for the most part been the focus of developing 
countries, the Doha Round, also known as the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) of 
negotiations, is grounded in development. This means that the objectives of this round are 
intended to reflect the developmental needs of developing countries through the prism of SDT 
provisions. The aim of this round is to strategise further on the liberalisation of trade, while 
making it easier for ‘developing countries and least developed countries to integrate into the 
multilateral trading system’.14 Developing countries are under-resourced and lack 
infrastructure, which, coupled with low research and innovation capacity, subsequently renders 
them a poor investment environment. These factors impact on their degree of trade 
liberalisation and cause an ineffective integration of developing countries in the global trading 
system. It is for this reason that Ismail suggests there be a global trade adjustment fund to aid 
developing countries in dealing with the impacts of trade liberalisation.15 
Despite being ‘sold’ as the beacon of hope for developing countries, Doha, which is the first 
round ever since the WTO has adopted the multilateral trading system, has had to deal with old 
and longstanding issues. The DDA simply continued the tradition of lowering trade barriers 
where possible and writing rules to maintain trade barriers and for other trade policies.16 
Notwithstanding the ample objectives in the WTO that are focused on development, the 
implementation of provisions that promote development is cumbersome. SDT is ‘sold’ as the 
ideal way of addressing these concerns, by enhancing economic growth and development 
through non-reciprocity and later through limited non-reciprocity when implementation came 
                                                          
13B Hoekman et al. Development, trade and the WTO: a handbook. Washington, DC: World Bank. (2002) 506. 
According to Hoekman, “the transition periods are probably meant to reflect the costs of changes in trade policy 
rules for an economy. There are typically three different types of cost: cost of adjustment, of implementation and 
compliance costs. A longer transition (implementation) period could be a way of reducing the adjustment cost.” 
14 Understanding the WTO: Doha Developmental Agenda. Available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/doha1_e.htm (Accessed 1 February 2017). 
15 F Ismail Mainstreaming Development in WTO – Developing Countries in the Doha Round CUTS International 
(2007) 21. 
16 Doha Round: What are they negotiating? Available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/update_e.htm (Accessed 1 February 2017). 
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to a halt.17 In particular, the SDT principle was employed by the WTO as a way to protect 
developing counties and their economies by allowing them to grow at a pace proportionate to 
their development level.18 According to the Preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement establishing 
the WTO, one of the stated objectives of SDT is to ‘ensure that developing countries, and 
especially the least-developed among them, secure a share in the growth of world trade 
commensurate with their needs’.19 This is evidence that SDT was a deep-rooted principle by 
the time GATT changed to WTO. 
1.2  RESEARCH PROBLEM 
Although SDT intends to capitalise on the liberalisation process through ‘development’ and 
fairness, the ineffective implementation thereof has a different outcome. Developing countries 
in the global trading system remain marginalised, resulting in developed countries being the 
sole beneficiaries of trade liberalisation. It is the argument of the thesis that SDT should not be 
used as an exploitative tool against the interests of developing countries. Even more so, 
developing countries should not ‘assume a position that SDT is an end-all solution to their 
problems’;20 but SDT provisions should be approached as a negotiation more than a financial 
aid scheme; otherwise it contravenes the fundamentals of the WTO, which is an organisation 
aimed at governing global trade. This causes a divergence between helping developing 
countries with economic growth and development on the one hand and promoting developed 
countries’ view of what type of development is best.21  
Of concern is that there seems to be a serious developmental conflict and/or crisis between the 
objectives of the WTO along with its principle of SDT and the implementation thereof, which 
is coupled with negative implications for developing countries.  
                                                          
17P. Schwartz. ‘Development in World Trade Law’. Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology. 
Vol. 4, Issue 1. Page 52 http://jiclt.com/index.php/jiclt/article/viewFile/70/69 (Accessed 1 February 2017). 
18 B Hoekman ‘Operationalizing policy space in the WTO: Beyond special and differential treatment’. Journal of 
International Economic Law (2005) 406. 
19 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization 1994. 
20 M Dube. The WTO Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) negotiations and developing countries: In pursuit 
of the ‘development agenda’. Published Dissertation of the University of Pretoria (2010) 52. 
21 P Kleen and S Page ‘Special and differential treatment of developing countries in the World Trade Organization’ 
Global Development Studies (2005) 51. 
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1.3 PRELIMINARY LITERATURE STUDY AND REASONS FOR CHOOSING 
TOPIC 
This research has an overwhelming significance legally and in the world of academia. It reveals 
the developmental gap that remains between developing and developed countries, which was 
something that was not envisioned by those who drafted the provisions relating to SDT. This 
affects Africa particularly, as Africa accounts for the majority of developing and least-
developed WTO member states. The future of Africa in the global trading system will depend 
on her capacity to negotiate favourable market access with her WTO counterparts; however, 
the basic structure of SDT makes it rather difficult to do so effectively.  
This research will reveal the rationale of protecting developing countries interests and 
encouraging trade and development insofar as the WTO legal framework permits it. There will 
further be possible economic, policy, legal, and social constraints which will be associated with 
any form of change to this effect. A crucial element in its ineffectiveness is that SDT is 
structured in a way that protects the interests of developing countries while expecting 
developed countries to restrict their interests. However, in doing so, this research will not make 
an economic analysis where development is concerned; instead reference will be drawn from 
other sources where economic authority is required. 
 1.4 LITERATURE REVIEW 
SDT is a longstanding principle; however, the DDA has sparked much debate about it because 
the round is centred on ‘development’. This indicates that it intends making an analysis and 
reconsidering the SDT provisions. According to Dube, ‘although “development is at the heart 
of the Doha Round”, however, the concept of development is not new to the WTO’.22 Dube 
also argues that ‘SDT should not be used as an exploitative tool against the interests of 
developing countries’.23 This means that SDT as it currently stands cannot be expected to be 
the only solution to fuel development. Bjornskov and Krivonos hold the view that any 
developmental effort must be evaluated against the positive effects of globalisation.24 The 
thesis agrees with this submission because there is a huge crisis relating to development which 
should continue to be at the forefront of WTO negotiations. It is obvious that a solution is 
needed that will shed light on how to manage SDT provisions and make them easily accessible 
                                                          
22 Note 20 above at 52. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Bjornskov & E Krivonos From Lome to Cotonou: The New EU-ACP Agreement (2001) 2. 
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and effective for developing countries. Needless to say, this cannot be done without the 
cooperation and willingness of developing countries and developed countries, otherwise SDT 
will forever remain deadlocked. 
Although SDT is intended to incorporate developing countries in the global trading system and 
improve their trading prospects, the implementation of this has been criticised. Roessler is of 
the opinion that SDT violates the principle of reciprocity and this consequently discourages 
developing countries from liberalising25 as reciprocity is favoured by developed countries and 
it requires countries to exchange mutual trade concessions.26 This position is preferred by 
developed countries, and Jobim remarks that ‘developed countries, based on their economic 
superiority and underlining the importance of free trade through liberalisation policies, insist 
on the necessity of reciprocal commitments to promote economic growth and global welfare’.27 
This therefore creates a dilemma that was intended to be resolved at the DDA. A few studies 
have emphasised the importance of Reciprocity. Subramanian and Wei have analysed the 
impact GATT/WTO membership has on international trade flows, and their studies have shown 
that industrial countries which adhere to reciprocal trade negotiations have increased more in 
trade than developing countries, which had few obligations to reduce their own trade barriers.28  
The Preamble of GATT 1947 had intentions to raise living standards and ensure full 
employment through reciprocal free trade.29 However, Michalapoulos denies that developing 
countries were a priority when this was decided, and insists that GATT was simply intended 
for trading without discrimination among equals, to the exclusion of developing countries.30 
Hence there is an inherent conflict between the WTO and SDT, and Dube is of the opinion that 
SDT was a compromise made as the WTO evolved. 31 Lichtenbaum confirms that the principle 
of SDT was adopted to address ‘the conflict between trade and socio-economic development 
                                                          
25 F Roessler ‘Domestic policy objectives and the multilateral trade order: Lessons from the past’. In A.O. Krueger 
(ed.), The WTO as an International Organization, University of Chicago Press (1998). 
26 Ibid. 
27 M Jobim ‘Drawing on the legal and economic arguments in favour and against reciprocity and special and 
differential treatment for developing countries within the WTO System’ Journal of Politics and Law Vol. 6 No.3 
(2013) 55. 
28 A Subramanian and S.J. Wei. ‘The WTO promotes trade, strongly but unevenly’ Journal of International 
Economics 72, (2007) 156. 
29 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947 (GATT 1947) 55 U.N.T.S 194.  
30 C Michalapoulos The Role of Special and Differential Treatment for Developing Countries in GATT and the 
World Trading System World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2388 (2000) 2. 
31Note 20 above at 28. 
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and that it was an acknowledgement of the economic vulnerabilities of the newly independent 
states and an attempt to re-distribute global wealth through the multilateral trading system’.32  
It was argued that the WTO Most Favoured Nation Principle will contribute towards trade 
liberalisation. This is another basic principle which provides for equal benefits among countries 
and which requires equal treatment between countries.33 On the contrary, Hoekman submits 
that this principle is not conducive for the growth and development and developing countries 
need protection from external competition.34 Bagwell and Staiger declare that developing 
countries will benefit from trade agreements only provided they do not simply ‘free ride’ on 
reciprocal MFN concessions between developed countries, but rather liberalise them.35 This 
argument is based on the effects that are caused by trade. This research will propose a similar 
argument; however, as the thesis argues that more emphasis should be put on trade 
liberalisation to help developing countries, which could in turn strengthen the multilateral 
trading system, perhaps then development of such countries will be fully realised.  
Athukorala and Jayasuria 36 address the issues not tackled in Hassan, namely the inadequate 
financial and technical resources that have effectively barred developing countries from 
reaping the benefits of trade liberalisation successes and market access. They tackle this issue 
not from a strictly legal perspective, but rather from an economics viewpoint. 
The need to provide additional development to developing countries can be found in the 
concept of Aid for Trade (AfT). The sixth Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong, China in 
2005 launched the AfT by endorsing it as one of the primary tasks of the WTO. It was held in 
the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration that: 
‘Aid for Trade should aim to help developing countries, particularly LDCs, to build the supply-
side capacity and trade-related infrastructure that they need to assist them to implement and 
benefit from WTO Agreements and more broadly to expand their trade’.37 
                                                          
32 Note 11 above at 1003. 
33 Article I.1 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947. 
34 Note 18 above at 406. 
35 K Bagwell and Staiger ‘Can the Doha Round be a development round? Setting a place at the table’. In R. C. 
Feenstra and A. M. Taylor (eds.), Globalization in an Age of Crisis: Multilateral Economic Cooperation in the 
Twenty-First Century, University of Chicago Press. (2014). 
36 P Athukorala and S Jayasuria Food Safety Issues, Trade and WTO Rules: A Developing Country Perspective, 
Blackwell Publishing Ltd (2003) 1396. 
37 Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration (WT/MIN(o5)/DEC), para. 57. 
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According to the WTO, AfT is there to assist developing countries and LDCs with trade-related 
infrastructure obstacles which cause constrains on their ability to fully engage in international 
trade.38 Karingi and Fabbroni hold that AfT is important and needed because there are a number 
of poor countries are unable to obtain global market opportunities which affects their ability to 
produce and export efficiently.39 They further highlight that:  
‘Aid for Trade is about investing in developing countries and it is fundamental for African 
countries that the initiative reaches full operationalization as soon as possible, and that Aid 
flows meet the right needs of beneficiary countries’.40 
Trade is an important aspect necessary to achieve development and if SDT in itself is not 
enough to reach this goal, it should then be applied in operation with AfT. This is important 
because according to Hoekman, although there is preferential treatment and SDT in particular 
to assist developing countries, many of these countries participation in global trade has been 
stagnant since the 1970s until today.41 
1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OBJECTIVES 
This research argues that although the provisions under the SDT are primarily for 
developmental purposes, however, by and large the implementation of the provisions within 
various WTO agreements are seemingly ineffective in addressing the ‘development’ issue as 
both an important principle under the SDT and as a general standalone term.  
The basis of this argument will lie is answering the following questions: 
a) What are the objectives of the WTO, and to what extent are these aimed at improving 
market access for developing countries? 
b) To what extent are requirements under the WTO for compatibility with the operation 
and implementation of SDT provisions by developed countries and developing 
countries, adhered to? 
                                                          
38 Aid for Trade Available at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/a4t_e/aid4trade_e.htm (Accessed 
11 November 2017). 
39 S Karingi and M Fabbroni The Reality of Aid for Trade in Africa Does Supply Meet Demand? Addis Ababa, 
ET: UNECA. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2009) Available at 
www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/publications/76.pdf  (Accessed 11 November 2017). 
40 Ibid. 
41 B Hoekman Aid for Trade: Why, What, and Where Are We? World Bank 2010 Available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources/239054-
1273092281133/Bernard_Hoekman_Aid_For_Trade.pdf (Accessed 11 November 2017). 
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c) To what extent does SDT uphold the interests of developing and developed countries? 
How best can SDT be effectuated to ensure that developing countries enjoy the benefits 
of the global trading system as envisioned by the objectives of the WTO? 
1.6 PRINCIPAL THEORIES 
The needs of countries are grounded on a theory of development that is supposed to deliver for 
both developing and developed countries. However, given the divergent needs and aspirations 
of these countries, there is some conflict on which theory is conducive for each of the country’s 
needs. The jurisprudence of the international trade regime therefore lies in following theories 
and principles: 
Trade liberalisation is one of the key aspects of this research. It calls for ‘the reduction of 
artificial barriers to international trade in goods and services’.42 This theory is a market model 
which allows for free trade in goods and services between countries with no impediments by 
government policies that impose tariff barriers.43 Eisenberg defines free trade as ‘general 
openness to exchange goods and information between and among nations with few-to-no-
barriers-to-trade’.44 This can serve as a vehicle to attain economic growth and development. It 
also resonates with the argument that free trade is a safety net for both parties involved in trade 
and the benefits of it far outweigh the losses.45  
Although trade liberalisation could ideally accelerate development for developing countries, 
after the establishment of GATT, developing countries came to the realisation that trade 
liberalisation policies were not too conducive to their development and therefore they needed 
the system to change. They therefore sought the protectionist theory as a strategy to remedy 
the problem in order to develop and expand their industrialisation while eliminating the balance 
of payment problems.46 This called for the ‘use of import substitution to promote 
industrialisation; use of export subsidies to promote exports; and use of trade controls for 
balance of payment purposes’.47 Michalopoulos asserts that this had an effect, and made 
requests for changes in the world trading system by consequently demanding flexibility for 
                                                          
42 M Winters and X Cirera Trade Liberalization and Poverty: A Handbook. (2002) 5. 
43 C Lumina ‘Free trade or just trade? The World Trade Organization, human rights and development’. Law, 
Democracy and Development. Vol 12, No.2 (2008) 24. 
44 J Eiesenberg Free Trade versus Fair Trade. Available at 
http://www.aworldconnected.org/article.php?id=560&print=1 (Accessed 10 March 2017). 
45 Friedman The Case for Free Trade Hoover Digest (1997) 4. 




developing countries in the application of trade rules and creation of trade preferences for 
developing countries.48 
Reciprocity is another basic principle which provides for equal benefits among countries. This 
means that a country that benefits from another country’s trade concessions should provide 
equal benefits in return.49 It is another basic principle which provides for equal benefits among 
countries.50 This principle in essence limits the free riding under the unconditional MFN 
principle.51 In practice, this is designed and is more effective if it is done among equals, which 
would consequently marginalise developing countries further.  
The emphasis on SDT within the WTO system demands that the concept of development be 
intertwined with the status of interaction between developing and developed countries. To that 
end, WTO does have development objectives however the effort to effectuate these efforts falls 
short. It is believed that through the focus on SDT, which is ‘based on the premise that 
development be equated to an increase in a country’s gross domestic product’.52 This can 
arguably be ‘traced back to the mercantilist and capitalist nature of the WTO and the trade 
negotiations which are basically a parallel of barter trade’.53  
1.7 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
There are various approaches that will be used for this research. The topic is littered with three 
different but interrelated disciplines: politics, law and economics. More so, each of these are 
based on important principles and theories which forms its foundation. However, the thesis will 
primarily focus on the legal nature and the WTO and SDT. A descriptive approach will 
therefore be used to describe both historic and existing situations relevant to the research. 
Secondly, an analytical approach will be used to analyse the GATT/WTO legal framework 
governing trade and trace the history of SDT through its current status within the WTO. 
Furthermore, a comparative analysis will be used to compare the implementation of SDT under 
various negotiations and agreements of the WTO. Lastly, a prescriptive approach will be used 
for possible policy considerations. 
                                                          
48 Ibid. 
49 T Cohn Global Political Economy Theory and Practice Pearson Education Inc (2005) 232. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 




The research will be facilitated by library research and desktop research. There are vast sources 
available in the international trade arena and therefore this research will require a critical 
analysis of primary and secondary sources.  
The primary sources will include the legal texts of the WTO dealing with the subject, policies, 
other relevant agreements, decided cases and general literature on the WTO in so much as it 
relates to the SDT principle. 
The secondary sources will include but not limited to journal articles, textbooks, study reports 
and policy papers on the implementation of SDT after the various processes and phases of 
which the principle has evolved written by academics and researchers on the issues relevant to 
the study.  
1.9 STRUCTURE OF DISSERTATION 
The dissertation will be structured as follows: 
1.8.1 Outline of study 
Chapter one  outlines the introduction to the study.  
Chapter two  focuses on the historic development of the WTO and a critical conceptual 
discussion on trade liberalisation and development. 
Chapter three is an analysis of  the history of SDT provisions as well as extend the concept of 
SDT as a legal principle within the WTO. The strengths and weaknesses are explored and how 
SDT works in terms of the participation of developing countries in the global trading system. 
In addition, the chapter  critically reviews the application of SDT in different Agreements under 
the WTO, which include General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the Agreement on Sanitary 
& Phytosanitary Measures and the Agreement on the Technical Barriers to Trade. 
Chapter four reviews current developments such as the Doha Development Agenda and how it 
intends to marry trade and development through SDT. This  also includes the Nairobi and Bali 
Ministerial Conference which took place recently. 
Chapter five contains the findings, conclusion and recommendations of the dissertation.  
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CHAPTER TWO:  
HISTORIC DEVELOPMENT  
OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) evolved through a series of 
agreements and multilateral trade negotiations. This entails eight rounds of trade–policy 
negotiations compliments of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as well at 
the completion of the Uruguay Round in 1994.54 The international trade agreements embodied 
in the WTO go far beyond a collection of legal texts and agreements. As such, the legal 
framework of the WTO cannot be viewed in isolation of the political and economic influences 
which led to the establishment of this widely accepted organisation. With this in mind, it can 
be argued that the WTO is the centre of the global trading system and is by the far the most 
influential international organisation.55 This Chapter will therefore focus on the historic 
development of the further have a critical conceptual discussion on trade liberalisation and 
development. This Chapter seeks to analyse the principle objectives of the WTO and from there 
analyse whether these objectives are in any way helping developing countries access other 
markets.  
2.2 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADING SYSTEM: 
WHERE IT ALL STARTED 
The basic starting point on understanding the history of the WTO needs to be analysed from 
the point of the economic and political events that led to the current international trade regime. 
As such, these events played a significant role in global economics and had the most influence 
in determining the agenda and operation of the WTO. These events include the influence of 
trade liberalisation in globalisation which has progressed in the following ways over three 
centuries: In the 18th century, Britain adopted free market and free trade policies and in the 
middle of the 19th century other countries started liberalising their trade, all thanks to the 
successes of Britain’s economy.56 Unfortunately things came to a halt after World War I in a 
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negative response to the instability of the global economy as countries began erecting trade 
barriers.57 
The trading system under the WTO dates back to the GATT of 1947 which was an interim 
agreement which provided rules for the global trading system. The origin of GATT can be 
traced back to the 1920s and 1930s, when trade barriers became increasingly restrictive 
following World War I.58 This reached an extreme level when the United States (US) enacted 
its infamous Smooth-Hawley Tariff Act in 1930 which resulted in tariffs increasing from 38 to 
52 percent.59 Other countries such as Japan and Germany also abandoned free trade and created 
high trade barriers which were associated with their fascism.60 Even more countries retaliated 
against this in the form of restrictive quotas and higher tariffs on US products.61 Despite 
Britain’s economic success before this period, it too ‘succumbed to temptation and itself re-
introduced tariffs’, putting an end to the free trade system in 1932.62 Because there was no 
world economic leadership during this time, such instability in the world economy along with 
World War II brought an end to what was left of the first liberal world order.63 
From the period of the Great Depression of 1929 straight through to the 1940s, the United 
States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK) were the key role players in defining the new world 
order which would be designed for the period following the World War II.64 This new world 
order was based on the ideology of trade liberalisation in an attempt to fight against the threat 
posed by the Soviet Union.65 It is through the period after World War II that reignited the 
situation of the world economy on a more liberal stance. Adhikari and Athukorala point out 
that for almost 50 years after World War II the global system essentially functioned without an 
organisation with defined rules of decision making and enforcement to deal with trade related 
issues among countries.66 The US then hosted a multilateral and binding conference in 1944 
known as the ‘UN Monetary and Financial Conference’, otherwise commonly known as the 
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Bretton Woods Conference (named after the place where it was hosted).67 The progress towards 
trade liberalisation was slow at this point and protectionism as well as state intervention 
persisted in most developing and communist countries.68 According to Jobim, the intention of 
the Bretton Woods Conference was therefore ‘to strengthen international cooperation between 
countries by coordinating policies and actions against protectionism in order to achieve 
economic growth’.69 It was this conference that led to the creation of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), which fell under the institution of the International Trade Organisation (ITO).70 
2.3 THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE ORGANISATION: A BRIEF OVERVIEW 
The end of World War II left many countries including the US in developing multilateral 
economic and political institutions that would aid the process of global economic 
reconstruction.71 It was in 1946 that the negotiations concerning the establishment of the ITO 
began.72 Markusen points out that this would be the establishment of the fourth major 
institution following the United Nations (UN), which is aimed at the resolution of political 
disputes; the IMF, which is designed assist countries in financial difficulties; and the World 
Bank, which provides development loans to developing countries.73 The ITO was intended to 
specify the regulations under which the multilateral negotiations would commence as well as 
the manner in which the rules would be applied.74  
The ITO was governed and regulated by the Havana Charter or Charter for an International 
Trade Organisation of 1948, which set out its principles and objectives.75 Markusen argues that 
‘the governing documents of the ITO, were quite ambitious, specifying a framework of rules 
covering not only tariffs on merchandise trade but certain domestic regulatory policies’.76 Such 
ambition in fact led agricultural and other business interests in the US and other nations to 
lobby against it as it had unacceptable and unnecessary constraints.77 Cohn remarks that ‘the 
charter was unusually broad in scope’78 as it not only dealt with commercial policy but also 
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incorporated economic development, full employment, international investment, international 
commodity arrangements, restrictive business practices, and the administration and functions 
of an ITO.79  
Because of the negative response against the adoption of the ITO, the US congress refused to 
ratify the Havana Charter, and consequently the ITO did not come into being at that time.80 
The reasons that led to this refusal are, according to Cohn, ‘complex and ironic, because the 
United States had originally proposed the creation of the ITO’.81 The Charter had to be drafted 
with specific sensitivity taking into consideration the post-war effect of Europe and its attempt 
to recover from the war. This meant that trade negotiators had to reach a point of convergence 
in terms of meeting everyone’s demands. In doing so, the trade negotiators satisfied neither 
protectionist nor free trade demands.82 Cohn points out that ‘US protectionists argued that the 
ITO would lead to low-cost imports and threaten US ability to form its own trade policy’ and 
on the contrary, ‘free traders believed that the charters numerous escape clauses and exceptions 
would interfere with trade liberalisation’.83 
Following the failure to establish the ITO, all subsequent multilateral negotiations were then 
carried through with the GATT framework.84 This was intended to be an interim agreement 
which was drawn directly from the principles of the ITO. However, despite its intended interim 
status, the GATT became the permanent international trade organization by default.85  
2.4 THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE: A BRIEF 
OVERVIEW 
As an alternative to the ITO, the US and other nations agreed to implement and develop 
components of the ITO which were less ambitious than the rest. One component was a 
multilateral agreement intended to negotiate reciprocal reductions in tariffs, while the other set 
out the general obligations pertaining to trade policy. These components were then put together 
as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.86 It was fully established in 1947 and it was 
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based on the Protocol of Provisional Application in Havana, Cuba.87 Unlike the ITO, the GATT 
required no ratification by the US Congress because as Jackson puts it, ‘it was a multilateral 
agreement among its contracting parties rather than a treaty among sovereign nations’.88 It is 
for this reason that countries that were signed to GATT were referred to as contracting parties 
as opposed to members.89 
In a comparison of ITO and GATT, Cohn states that: 
‘[u]nlike the ITO, which would have become a UN specialized agency on par with the IMF and 
the World Bank – GATT never attained specialized agency status. GATT continued to be 
primarily a written code of behaviour on international trade, and it had more limited legal 
obligations and dispute settlement procedures than the planned ITO. GATT also lacked the 
Havana Charter’s provisions relating to investment, employment, commodity agreements and 
restrictive business practices’.90 
The plan was for GATT to be an interim agreement to carry out the multilateral negotiations; 
however, Jackson says that ‘GATT gradually developed some characteristics of an 
International Organization’.91 Jackson bases this on the fact the GATT had a small secretariat 
and a couple of committees and working parties, but it also had power to make decisions that 
would be binding on members.92 The strengths of the GATT lie in its successful way of 
reducing tariffs and the manner in which it managed to negotiate non-tariff barriers.93 This 
contributed to its fast growing membership. Due to the GATTs informality and flexibility, this 
made room for several weaknesses within it framework.94 Firstly, the fact that GATT was not 
a formal organisation meant that its members could easily violate and waive the regulations 
imposed by GATT.95 
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The GATT states in its Preamble the objectives of the contracting parties include: 
‘raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume 
of real income and effective demand, developing the full use of resources of the world and 
expending the production and exchange of goods’.96 
In its Preamble, the GATT also states that it intends to achieve this by: 
‘[r]eciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction in 
tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in 
international commerce’.97 
GATT puts significant emphasis on reciprocity, and Bagwell and Staiger highlight the fact that 
“free trade” is not mentioned anywhere under the objectives of the GATT. They add further 
that ‘instead, the emphasis is on reciprocal tariff reductions extended in a non-discriminatory 
fashion in order that participating parties could mutually benefit from the resulting increase in 
income’.98 Because GATT was a compromise after the failure of the ITO, the Havana Charter 
contained a provision for the use of protectionist trade measures.99 This was done with a view 
to establish, develop or reconstruct a particular industry, provided that the other contracting 
parties agreed to it.100  
Since the establishment of GATT in 1947 there have been eight rounds of multilateral trade 
negotiations and the theme of these rounds were focused on liberalisation as the main trade 
principle. GATT promoted liberalisation by explicitly lowering import tariffs through the series 
of multilateral trade negotiations. This was successfully implemented on certain goods; 
however, with agriculture and textiles, Bagwell and Staiger argue, the liberalisation process 
moved really slowly.101 Moreover, GATT could not flourish because it was meant to be an 
interim agreement and was therefore not equipped to deal with issues such as new trade policy 
considerations, which became increasingly important to the global economy. 102 It is for this 
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reason Jackson says that GATT ‘limped along for nearly fifty years with almost no basic 
constitution designed to regulate its organisational activities and procedures’’103 
The rules of GATT are laid out in thirty-nine articles, and at the heart of this series of articles 
are the principles of reciprocity and non-discrimination.104 The basic principle of GATT is non-
discrimination, which has two elements in its fold, one being the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) 
which requires the equal treatment between countries. As such, Article I.1 of the GATT holds 
that: 
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with 
importation or exportation or imposed on the international transfer of payments for imports or 
exports, and with respect to the method of levying such duties and charges, and with respect to 
all rules and formalities in connection with importation and exportation, and with respect to all 
matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III, any advantage, favour, privilege or 
immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any 
other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating 
in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.105 
As a result of this principle, if one country grants another country a special favour, such as 
lowering the customs duty rate for one of their products, it has to do the same with other 
countries as well.106 Lester says that ‘the MFN principle means that every time a country lowers 
a trade barrier or opens up a market, it has to do so for like goods and services from all its 
trading partners’.107 
Like any other rule, there are exceptions, and the MFN has three important exceptions to which 
it is subject. First, Article XXIV of the GATT set out procedures which allowed countries to 
form regional trading arrangements such as free trade and customs unions. Secondly, different 
treatment among developed and developing countries was encouraged which had to be 
proportionate to their development stages. This was done by developing the Generalised 
System of Preferences (GSP) under the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD). GSP was, however, a clear deviation from Article I of the GATT, which prohibits 
discrimination; hence it is one of the exceptions. Jobim emphasises that: 
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‘[f]or the GSP to be operative, a waiver pursuant of Article XXV of the GATT was created in 
1971 in order to mitigate the content of the MFN clause of Article I and thereby to permit in 
the implementation of a preferential system within the international trade regime. In 1979, the 
rule of preferences was definitely established in a permanent basis with the introduction of the 
Enabling Clause’.108 
There are three main objectives of the GSP, namely: 
i. To extend earnings on exports of developing countries by opening up developed 
country markets to them; 
ii. To allocate other means of export earnings for developing countries by weaning them 
away from commodities and raw materials whose price instability contributes to 
chronic trade deficits, and encourages exports oriented industrialisation; and  
iii. Accelerate their rates of economic growth.109 
GSPs were intended to encourage industrialisation and trade development, but they had no 
solid scope in their application. They were based purely on the discretion of developing 
countries to administer the GSP system, and it was for this reason that the system received 
much criticism. The third and final exception to the MFN rule was agreed on in the Tokyo 
Round of the GATT in the 1970s, where countries were allowed to negotiate side agreements 
among themselves, known as ‘Codes’. These meant that only the Code signatories were 
obligated to treat one another without discrimination, providing a ‘conditional MFN 
treatment’.110 
Another important principle under GATT is National Treatment (NT), which requires equal 
treatment between and within countries.111 According to Lester, this principle focuses on 
‘treating foreigners and locals equally, further giving others the same treatment as one’s own 
nationals’.112 Article III of the GATT requires that imported and locally produced goods should 
be treated equally, and the same should apply to foreign and domestic services. According to 
the text of Article III of the GATT: 
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(1) ‘The contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and other internal charges, and laws, 
regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, 
transportation, distribution or use of products, and internal quantitative regulations requiring 
the mixture, processing or use of products in specified amounts or proportions, should not be 
applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic production.  
(2) ‘The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other 
contracting party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal 
charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products. 
Moreover, no contracting party shall otherwise apply internal taxes or other internal charges 
to imported or domestic products in a manner contrary to the principles set forth in paragraph 
1. 
(3) ‘(…) 
(4) ‘The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other 
contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like 
products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their 
internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. The provisions of 
this paragraph shall not prevent the application of differential internal transportation charges 
which are based exclusively on the economic operation of the means of transport and not on 
the nationality of the product.’113 
Cohn is of the opinion that ‘this provision is designed to prevent countries from using domestic 
measures to limit foreign competition as their tariffs and other external trade barriers 
decline’.114 The history of the GATT/WTO shows divergent approaches to interpreting Article 
III of the GATT. These include ‘aims-and-effects approaches that focus on discerning 
protectionist intent; and economic or market-based approaches that focus on domestic fiscal or 
regulatory measures that upset competitive relationships between imports and domestic 
products’.115 
At the centre of these principles there was also the impact of reciprocity, which requires 
countries that benefit from other countries to provide roughly the equal benefits in return. 
Article XXVIII holds that reciprocity means ‘that tariff negotiations should be conducted on a 
reciprocal and mutually advantageous basis.’116 This rule is based on four sound reasons that 
have been formulated to justify this rule, namely (i) to avoid ‘free riders’ under the 
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unconditional MFN principle117; ‘(ii) to satisfy a country’s domestic sceptics; (iii) to be a 
bargaining chip in negotiations with other countries and (iv) to encourage countries to reduce 
their trade barriers’.118 
There were a number of notable gaps in the structure of the GATT, and Alavi holds that it is 
due to ‘its provisional nature, the lack of any organisation to support it, its vague and somehow 
incomplete rules, and its many exceptions to the general rules’.119 It is not surprising that these 
problems were addressed in the Uruguay Round of the GATT, which was a contentious round 
that lasted from 1986 to 1994.120 The Uruguay Round was the eighth post-war round of 
multilateral trade negotiations and the sixth round of multilateral trade negotiations conducted 
under the GATT. Kenwood and Lougheed allege that it ‘was the most ambitious of them all, 
taking seven years of hard bargaining in areas of trade which, for decades, had been considered 
too difficult’.121 In the past, GATT had primarily focused on the trade in commodities and 
manufactured goods. It was not until the Uruguay Round that it achieved a fair level of success 
in the liberalisation of agricultural and textile goods and intellectual property.122 
Like other negotiations conducted under the GATT, the purpose of the Uruguay was to 
liberalise trade. It was expected that the Uruguay Round would continue moving towards a 
more open international trade regime. This did not happen. According to Macrory, Appleton 
and Plummer, ‘the Uruguay Round produced a profound alteration of the trade regime in 
response to an equally profound transformation of international economic relations.’123 If 
anything, the Uruguay Round resulted in a systematic change in the world economy.  
The Uruguay Round is notably the most significant round of all multilateral trade negotiations 
conducted under the GATT and the significance is better understood when it’s compared with 
the Tokyo Round of 1973 – 1979 which was at the time the most significant round under the 
GATT.124 The main role players in the Tokyo Round were developed countries while the 
developing countries were not so much involved. When this round was concluded, very few 
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developing countries had signed one of the nine agreements under the Tokyo Round.125 And 
African countries? 
Shenkar and Luo are of the opinion that the Uruguay Round was intended for the expansion of 
the GATT framework and ‘reintroduced the idea of a comprehensive international trade 
organisation to coordinate international economic activities including those involving a large 
number of developing countries.’126 Macrory, Appleton and Plummer further add that: 
‘[d]eveloping countries were active in all phases of the Uruguay Round, and their involvement 
broadened the potential for trade-offs and the package deal that ultimately was agreed upon. 
The strong support of developing countries was instrumental in encouraging the major parties 
– the United States and European Union – to settle. It is true that the diplomatic behaviour of 
the Uruguay Round still reflected the bipolar structure that had characterised the Tokyo Round, 
but the former was nevertheless impacted by the new actors that had capacity to force changes 
in the process and outcome of the negotiations’.127 
The major feature of the conclusion of the Uruguay Round was its establishment of the WTO, 
which in essence completed the work of the ITO which had been abolished.  
2.5 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 
As has been highlighted above, the WTO, which is a successor of the GATT, evolved through 
a number of multilateral trade negotiations which include old and new issues of trade. The 
move from GATT to WTO was essential because the GATT was not an organisation as such, 
but an arrangement by means of which countries could discuss and agree on issues pertaining 
to international trade. The Uruguay Round, being the eighth and final round of multilateral 
trade negotiations, finally led to the establishment of the WTO. It was established through the 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, commonly known as the WTO 
Agreement, and this was done by signing the agreement in Marrakesh, Morocco in April 1994. 
Upon the establishment of the WTO, it was decided that the WTO Agreement would come into 
force on 1 January 1995; and in the same breath it was decided that the GATT of 1947 would 
be terminated on 31 December  1994.128  
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According to the WTO Agreement, the main objective of the WTO is the following: 
‘To provide a common institutional framework for the conduct of trade relations among its 
members … with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large 
and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, and expanding the 
production of and trade in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world’s 
resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development’.129 
The first and most important function of the WTO is generally to implement the facilitation, 
administration and operation of the WTO agreement and, most importantly, to further their 
objectives.130 It is a multilateral trade organisation aimed at international trade liberalisation. 
Because it is a successor of the GATT, Shenker and Luo hold that the main objectives, aims 
and rules of the WTO still ‘foster non-discrimination, transparency and predictability in the 
conduct of trade policy.’131 The WTO therefore upholds these objectives ‘by administering 
trade agreements; acting as a forum for negotiating trade; to administer Dispute Settlement 
Understanding; reviewing national trade policies; to assist developing countries on trade policy 
issues, through technical assistance and cooperating with other international organisations.’132  
The governance structure of the WTO makes the Ministerial Conference the top-level decision-
making body of the WTO and Article IV of the WTO Agreement provides that all decision-
making powers shall reside in a Ministerial Conference, which should be held at least every 
two years and should be attended by ministers from all WTO Members.133 In between the 
Ministerial Conference intervals, the General Council, which comprises of ambassadors of 
member states, may exercise decision-making powers.134 
Despite the GATT being terminated and replaced with the WTO, the WTO Agreement includes 
the text of GATT and as such it continues to exist as a substantive agreement. Bagwell and 
Staiger point out that ‘the WTO Agreement includes … a set of additional agreements that 
build on and extend GATT principles to new areas’.135 As mentioned above, for example, the 
WTO carries through the principle of non-discrimination through Most-Favoured Nation 
(MFN) and National Treatment (NT) as with the GATT. Because the WTO was established for 
                                                          
129 Article II.1 of The Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization 1995.  
130 Article III of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization 1995. 
131 Note 126 above.  
132 Article III of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization 1995. 
133 Note 123 above at 62. 
134 Ibid. 
135 Note 35 above at 1. 
24 
 
the improvement of world trading system, Adhikari and Athukorala opine that ‘the WTO 
provides the world trading system with an effective institutional and legal framework for the 
design and enforcement of trade rules’.136 In a comparison with the GATT preamble, the WTO 
Agreement adds worth and significance to respecting and preserving the environment, the 
objective of sustainable development as well as the development of developing countries.137 
2.6 DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD TRADING 
SYSTEM 
Developing countries are considerably weak and late bloomers to economic growth and 
development. With the establishment of the WTO there had to be major transformative changes 
that had to be implemented in the world trading system. During the period of the GATT, 
developing countries were largely on the sidelines of the world trading system.138 This meant 
that developing countries were not serious participants in any of the functioning of the world 
trading system. The underlying theories of trade at the time as well as the development 
prevalent during this period emphasised that development is essential to protect developing 
countries from the competitive work market.139 Barceló’s evaluations of the GATT period of 
1947 to 1995 show that ‘developing countries need to protect “infant industries” and a shelter 
local producer was highly touted.’ He further points out the evidence of this as found under 
Article XXVIII of the GATT which indicates that ‘under its provisions developing countries 
have wide-ranging authority to protect select industries with quotas that would otherwise run 
afoul of Article XI’s prohibition on quantitative restrictions’.140 
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In 1979, the GATT adopted an exception in favour of developing countries as a way to improve 
their role in the international trading system. The Enabling Clause was thus enacted, and it 
allows developed countries, or otherwise industrial countries, to grant developing countries 
preferential access to their markets. 141 This is commonly known as the GSP regime as 
discussed above. For developed countries, the Enabling Clause has given them wide and 
discretionary powers to manage and to build their own system of preferences. This meant that 
such countries could choose the products they would like to import and the unfortunate 
consequence of this for developing countries was that developed countries could create 
‘perverse incentives against manufacturing in poor countries.’142 As expected, this instantly 
caused great instability in the system which prevented developing countries to have a solid and 
long-term possibility of economic growth and development. 
Developing countries have always desired an international trading system that fully 
incorporates them and to fit in harmoniously in the world trading system. During the period 
that led to the establishment of the Havana Charter of 1947, Kenneth Dem said positively that: 
‘It was the US position that less-developed countries could best develop by participating fully 
in a multilateral non-discriminatory system with the lowest possible levels of tariffs and no 
quantitative restrictions. This position proved totally unacceptable to the less-developed world, 
which sought both affirmative commitments by all member countries to further the process of 
economic development, and, more important, specific exceptions to many of the prohibitions 
of the Charter in order to permit the less-developed countries to follow an independent 
commercial policy. The reigning view in less-developed countries was that economic 
development … required the creation of import substitution industries. It was asserted that such 
industries could flourish only behind high tariff walls supplemented … by quantitative 
restrictions’.143  
The prospect of full participation in the multilateral trading system was, and to a large extent 
still is, bleak for developing countries. In an attempt to remedy this, these countries had to be 
very critical of the applicability of certain principles such as non-discrimination enshrined in 
Article I of the GATT. Developing countries therefore argued that ‘equal treatment of unequals 
is unjust’, and they have vouched that there has to be some discrimination in their favour in 
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this instance.144 According to Hoekman, their desire here was, firstly, to be excused from 
making reciprocal tariff reductions as per Part IV of the GATT; second, to have tariff 
preferences in markets of developing countries; and last, to be afforded special and more 
favourable treatment.145 This created a well-intentioned understanding that a specific set of 
rules applied for developing countries while others did not apply. The report of the Brand 
Commission also emphasises that ‘the Tokyo Round agreement had recognized that 
preferential treatment of developing countries should be accepted as a permanent feature of the 
world trading system rather than a temporary exception’.146 
The Uruguay Round that took place under the GATT framework was the first of its kind to 
include developing countries into the trading system as partners. Therefore, when the WTO 
came into being, it did so on the basis of the ‘single undertaking’. Steger defines the Single 
Undertaking as ‘an all or nothing package’ which is designed to bring uniformity between 
member states.147 This meant that all previous members of the GATT, developing countries 
included, could subsequently be contracting parties of the WTO and all its agreements.148 
Developing countries had to accept the core rules of the GATT although they had not been 
functioning participants from the onset. This also included agreeing to what had previously 
been ‘side agreements’ which amended, expanded and tightened the original GATT rules.149 
This is mainly because GATT was constructed with a multitude of loopholes. Because of this 
bargain, developing countries also had to accept the new agreement on intellectual property 
(also known as the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, or TRIPS) and they 
also gained some advantages in agriculture and textiles.150 
Despite the efforts of the Uruguay Round to improve the position of developing countries, it 
did not fully attend to certain issues within the system. The exception under the GSP was left 
in creating, and more so continuing the discrimination in favour of developing countries within 
the international trading system. Although this seems like positive discrimination against 
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developing countries, it is also discrimination against them as it does not treat them like fully 
fledged members.  
2.7 UNDERLYING THEORIES 
Having established the institutions and agreements governing international trade, it is now 
pertinent for the research to embark on a brief discussion of the underlying theories which 
could be argued form the foundation current international trade relations. International trade is 
primarily the exchange of goods and services across borders. Shenker and Luo explain that 
export structures vary across countries and therefore countries do not mimic each other as they 
have different vulnerabilities to trade conditions.151 International trade theories are therefore in 
place to explain this.  
The first theory in international trade history is the mercantilist theory, which emerged in the 
mid-sixteenth century in England. The term ‘mercantilism’ was first used by Adam Smith, an 
English economist who used it in reference to economic thought and practice.152 It places great 
emphasis on the ability of the government to improve the well-being of its residents using a 
system of centralised controls. Mercantilists strongly believed that there was a strong 
connection between power and wealth and that these were progressive tools to achieve 
legitimate goals of national policy.153 It was a big view of mercantilists that a state’s power 
depended on the amount of gold and silver it could accumulate in the public treasury.154 
Shenker and Luo explain that: 
‘[u]nder mercantilism, the government had two goals in foreign economic policy. The first goal 
was to increase the wealth of the nation by acquiring gold. Mercantilists identified national 
wealth with the size of a nation’s reserves of precious metals (which could be used to hire 
mercenary armies). The second policy goal was to “extract trade gains from foreigners through 
regulations and controls so as to achieve a surplus in the balance of trade through maximizing 
exports (e.g., subsidies) and minimizing imports (e.g., tariffs and quotas)’,155 
Mercantilism lies in the idea that trade stimulates the economy in way that is aimed at the 
accumulation of bullion (precious metal) and national power.156 Mercantilists therefore took 
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all necessary measures to ensure that their gold and silver was accumulated. This was done by 
increasing their exports and decreasing their imports.157 This theory served as an integral part 
of building up state authority as well as territorial unification through its emphasis on national 
power. However, it has been criticised by Adam Smith as he believed that mercantilists 
followed ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ policies that would eventually lead to international conflict. 
The main reason for this is that it would be fairly impossible for all states to have a ‘balance-
of-trade’ surplus, which means more exports than imports.158  
The prevailing economic wisdom according to Wolf is that ‘rules of international economic 
order exist to bind governments and restricts their actions, in order to allow agents, wherever 
located, to make long term plans … to participate fully in the integrated world economy.’159 
These rules of international trade are in place to help countries survival within the international 
trade community160. Wolf is also of the opinion that: 
‘[t]he rules of the international trading system were not designed to achieve free trade. It was 
accepted that individual countries were bound to differ on this issue and that many would wish 
to reserve the right to protect. At the same time, it is politically difficult to sustain greater 
liberalism in one democratic country than in another when they are in apparently similar 
circumstances’.161 
Since the mercantilist prejudices are somewhat strong, it renders it virtually impossible to 
liberalise trade unilaterally. Wolf argues that reciprocal bargaining over trade barriers has 
become the best instrument of general trade liberalisation; however, the principle of reciprocity 
is an effective technique to effect liberalisation but it actually also generates conflict and 
resentment where no economic justification exists.162 There have been some strong arguments 
made against liberalisation by developing countries, the principle reason being that ‘developing 
countries already import all they can’, and, with their high level of indebtedness, can certainly 
not import any more. Moreover, trade liberalisation is also considered by some as being the 
key to economic growth and development, and it is also feasible that some countries have 
strongly benefited from opening up their markets. The advantage of liberalisation is that it will 
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decrease discrimination against various sectors of trade, while boosting imports and exports 
increase in investment which will all trigger productivity gain while also increasing the 
economic growth.163 
On the other hand, developed countries are well-known for their protectionist disposition 
(which can be traced to early developments of trade), especially on products of export interest 
to developing countries. This protectionist tendency includes ‘major disparities in the tariffs 
applied among developed countries themselves’ compared to those applied on developing 
country products. The protection granted to developed countries ‘costs developing countries in 
excess of the official development assistance flows’.164 With the prevalence of protectionism, 
interestingly the average tariff rate applied by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) countries in respect of developing country exports on a MFN basis is 
four times more than what they apply among themselves.165 
The most important of these underlying theories is that they must contribute to the theory of 
development. After the Uruguay Round, developing countries had expected a largely positive 
outcome, and by and large the outcomes of this Round were supposed to reflect the 
developmental aspirations of developing countries as well as fuel economic growth and 
development. Development is an ideology or otherwise theory that has no standard definition 
within the WTO as the question ‘how’ development is to be achieved has not been fully 
explored. Actually, this is probably the reason the development crisis of developing countries 
cannot be fully addressed. Emmerij defines it as ‘the idea that all countries could purposefully 
pursue policies of economic and social advance, which overtime would rapidly improve the 
welfare and living standards of their population’.166 Development is a constant thread running 
through the WTO and it is at the heart of the Doha Round of negotiations, which seeks to 
address the correlation between trade and development. The banner of this round is labelled 
the Doha Developmental Agenda and will be discussed further later in research.  
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This chapter has shown the evolution of the world trading system and also signifies the need 
of the WTO to govern and regulate the trading system. It has also shown how some issues that 
existed in the past are still relevant today and are useful in shaping the global economy. With 
every organisation or agreement that had been deadlocked from the ITO to the GATT, there 
has always been an alternative to secure its effectiveness to keep the world trading system 
operational. Currently, the crisis lies in development, particularly for developing countries and 
it seems imperative that the WTO prioritises getting a point of convergence between 




CHAPTER THREE:  
SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT  
WITHIN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
When the WTO launched the Doha Round of trade negotiations, the debate around the meaning 
of Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) was put under the spotlight, as well its 
contribution to development. SDT was established in response to the economic vulnerabilities 
of developing countries and the trade inequalities through the multilateral trading system. In 
preparation for the fourth session of the Ministerial Conference, the need for SDT was 
described as follows: 
‘It was conceived in acknowledgement of the fact that developing countries were at … very 
different stages of economic, financial and technological developments and therefore had 
entirely different capacities as compared to developed countries in taking on multilateral 
commitments and obligations.’167 
Despite this, SDT provisions have been largely criticised for their ineffectiveness and bear very 
little evidence of practical use in the WTO; consider their failure to promote the development 
needs for developing countries. In theory, however, SDT provisions seem to have great 
potential, but it is the implementation of them that falls short. This is because the provisions 
under SDT do not fully represent the spectrum of possibilities for developing countries.  
This chapter will briefly discuss the history of SDT provisions and its meaning as a legal 
principle within the WTO framework. It will also analyse its strengths and weaknesses in terms 
of the impact it has on developing countries within the global trading system. Lastly, this 
chapter will critically review the application of SDT provisions in different WTO Agreements. 
3.2 MEANING OF SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT 
The Preamble of the Agreement Establishing the WTO states its wishes to ensure that 
developing countries have a secure share of growth under international trade and that this 
growth should at the very least be proportionate to the developing countries’ economic 
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development capacity.168 According to Dube, this means that by the time GATT changed to 
WTO, SDT was already firmly entrenched as a principle.169 Since trade liberalisation is ‘the 
reduction of artificial barriers to international trade in goods and services’,170 the underlying 
rationale of SDT lies in the belief that trade liberalisation under MFN is not sufficiently 
adequate for the development of developing countries and that they need a bit more protection 
from external competition.171 The aim of SDT is therefore to protect the interests of developing 
countries and assist in their participation in the multilateral trading system. 
As mentioned above, SDT is one of the core principles of the WTO framework and it is 
exclusively for the use and benefit of developing countries and least developed countries. There 
are over 150 SDT provisions under the WTO, and these fall specifically under the realm of 
‘development’.172 These provisions merely show the variety and forms of which SDT can be 
applied. The Secretariat of the WTO has classified the various SDT provisions into six 
categories, namely: 
a) provisions aimed at increasing the trade opportunities and assist the domestic industries 
of developing countries;  
b) provisions under which the WTO members should safeguard the interests of 
developing countries. This can be done by implementing procedures in enforcement of 
the rights of or against developing countries;  
c) flexibility of commitments, if action, and use of policy instruments; 
d) provisions for transitional time periods for developing and least developed countries; 
e) provisions for technical assistance to developing and least developed countries 
provisions; and  
f) provisions relating to least developed country Members.173 
Of these various provisions, some are more effective and meaningful in their scheme of 
application. These six categories also suggest better ways to improve the position of developing 
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countries in the world trading system, at the same time trying to further achieve the objectives 
of the WTO.  
To ensure that the implementation of these provisions is effective, ‘non-binding provisions 
need to be made binding in order to provide some means and improve prospects for securing 
their implementation’.174 In the same breath, ‘the mandatory obligations need to be highlighted 
so that they can be implemented immediately and unconditionally’.175 Another problem with 
enforceability relates to the nature of the language used to express the obligations. According 
to Garcia, these provisions should be divided according to the nature of their language, and 
only then will it be more useful to decide whether and how to make these provisions 
mandatory.176 When divided, Garcia then provides four categories under which these 
provisions should fall under. First are provisions employing purely discretionary language, 
which means that the provision is merely permissive and does not create any legal obligation.177 
Second would be the “best endeavours” clauses, which express a moral obligation on Members 
to ‘try their best’.178 Third are the de facto non-binding or fake mandatory provisions which 
employ words of a mandatory nature but are structured in a way that gives them no legal 
effect.179 Last are the mandatory provisions which use language that requires concrete, 
enforceable commitments.180 Garcia’s argument must be understood along with the general 
functioning of the multilateral trade agreements, and the extent to which SDT forms an integral 
part of the entire WTO system, as its objectives are to improve the living conditions of 
developing and least developed countries, while effectively securing their fruitful participation 
in the multilateral trading system.181 Also, SDT has been argued to be intended to address the 
disparities that are prevalent among developed, developing and least-developed countries, and 
make adjustments where necessary to enable developing and least developed countries to 
meaningfully benefit from trade agreements.182 Lastly, the assistance provided by developed 
countries to developing and least developed countries should be consistent with their 
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developmental needs.183 Thus, the use of such language does not provide much assistance in 
ensuring that SDT provisions are effective in securing fruitful participation of developing 
countries in the global trading system. 
The presence (generally) of these provisions and the extent in which they are used through the 
WTO system does not equate with their effective application. Dube argues that there is a clear 
lack of convergence between the provisions as stated on paper and the actual application of 
SDT.184 Such failure has therefore led developing countries to push for a more ‘development’-
centred agenda in the Doha Round.185 
As such, the Doha Ministerial Declaration186 focused on strengthening SDT. In this round, 
developing countries pointed out the shortcomings of SDT provisions and wanted better 
implementation of the provisions which would also result in the provision of more feasible 
benefits. Paragraph 44 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration States as follows: 
‘We reaffirm that provisions for special and differential treatment are an integral part of WTO 
Agreements. We note the concerns expressed regarding their operation in addressing specific 
constraints faced by developing countries, particularly least-developed countries. In that 
connection, we also note that some members have proposed a Framework Agreement on 
Special and Differential Treatment (WT/GC/W/442). We therefore agree that all special and 
differential treatment provisions shall be reviewed with a view to strengthening them and 
making them more precise, effective and operational. In this connection, we endorse the work 
programme on special and differential treatment set out in the Decision on Implementation-
Related Issues and Concerns’.187  
The intended outcome of this paragraph would be to strengthen the SDT provisions to make 
them more precise, effective and operational.188 Ensuring that SDT provisions and objectives 
are effectively applied depends much on whether developed countries can apply SDT 
provisions effectively and to their optimum potential. To a great extent, the challenge lies in 
applying a blanket rule on what the ‘special needs’ are for developing and least-developed 
countries. Another defect is the WTOs failure to define what a developing country is, which 
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could also possibly be a limitation of the scope of effective application of the SDT.189 This 
begs the question whether SDT is relevant in upholding developing countries interests and at 
the same time being compatible with the developmental objectives of the WTO. De Vylder is 
of the opinion that it is important to remember, when assessing SDT provisions, that ‘they were 
not introduced because of a common conviction that they are the best way to promote 
development for developing countries’.190 He further argues that ‘SDT is generally superficial 
in the sense that it is not based on the analyses of the special needs of developing countries’.191 
As such, it should be noted that the economic growth and development of a country is not 
dependent only on international trade, even though it is invariably one of the biggest and most 
important tools that can be used to alleviate poverty, while fuelling economic growth and 
development. Hoekman draws on the fact that a country’s own trade policies can be one of the 
primary aspects that determines their benefits,192 and adds that ‘establishing the appropriate 
trade and complementary policies should consequently figure in the design of national 
development and poverty-reduction strategies’.193 Hoekman’s view on this is influenced by the 
fact that by and large, a country’s trade policies are bound to both multilateral and regional 
disciplines and individual countries trade performance is thus determinant on other countries 
actions or omissions.194 
It is important to remember that the WTO provides a forum to negotiate improved market 
access and to formulate rules on agreements of trade related matters which is intended to be 
beneficial for both developing and developed countries. Since developing countries primarily 
benefit from the rules-based system; they would not be able to negotiate in their own favour 
and would have very little influence on policies of large countries.195 The big challenge, 
however, lies in getting the rules right. One of the dimensions of the SDT system is also based 
on rules, which include calls for developed countries to provide assistance to developing and 
least-developed countries, to help them implement certain disciplines as well as exempt them 
from certain rules of the WTO.  
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Likewise, the challenge here is implementing SDT provisions in a manner that will be 
beneficial for developing countries, particularly considering the non-mandatory element of 
SDT provisions.196 The criteria used to implement these rules do not do much in contributing 
to making the exemptions very meaningful.197 An example of this is the extended deadlines 
enjoyed by developing countries. These are often arbitrarily established and inconsistent with 
their objective. De Vylder’s observation is that ‘the rationale behind longer deadlines is based 
on the assumption that the regulations are, in principle, good for everyone but developing 
countries need a little more time to implement them’.198 Instead, the consequence of these 
exemptions is that they are intended to deal with temporary transitional problems when 
introducing new regulations instead of managing development.199 
Not only are there divergent interests between developed and developing countries, there is 
also an issue of special preferences that are granted to developing countries, cause friction 
between them and least-developed countries. Kleen and Page make an observation that: 
‘[a]s long as SDT offered to LDCs was a little different from that of developing countries, as 
long as all SDT was regarded as an unimportant issue by most developed countries, and as long 
as GATT regulated only lightly what types of SDT were actually offered by developed 
countries, and as long as GATT regulated only lightly what types of SDT were actually offered 
by developed countries, the issue of which countries were in which classes was more for 
academic debate than active negotiation. All these conditions have changed. For non-LDCs at 
low income levels, often with close regional association to LDCs (Kenya in East Africa, 
Zimbabwe or Mauritius in Southern Africa, Ghana or Nigeria in West Africa), what was a 
minor technical difference is becoming a conspicuous disadvantage, a potential cause of 
diverted investment, and at a minimum a complication from rules of origin in their own regions 
and in exports to other markets’.200 
This, in short, sums up the key issues that are embedded in SDT and need to be resolved. 
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3.3 HISTORY OF SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT 
Since the 1950s, developing countries have received a form of special treatment, which is 
known as special and differential treatment. However, SDT, as it is commonly referred to, is 
not necessarily a programme with a purpose of strengthening developing countries’ trade and 
development; instead it is a collection of provisions which vary in both character and 
importance.201 This means some provisions and regulations are binding while others are not, 
and some apply only to LDCs to the exclusion of developing countries. This potentially creates 
a pattern of holistic ineffectiveness of all SDT provisions.  
The need for SDT provisions in the GATT may date back to the 1950s and possibly even much 
earlier than that. The underlying reasons for the need during this period relates to the fact that 
in the 1950s, the balance of payment problems for developing countries were caused by the 
low-income status, which this would result in developing countries facing permanent balance 
of payment problems. 202 This meant that it was impossible for most developing countries to 
liberalise, because such actions would only widen their trade deficits. Whalley also adds that 
these arguments were complemented by the Prebisch-Singer thesis, dating back to the 1950s, 
which posed the argument that ‘developing countries always face a secular decline in their 
terms of trade; suggesting that developing countries would need to be given preferential access 
to developed county markets to offset these effects’.203 
Before SDT was firmly established, the issues surrounding its provisions and the 
implementation thereof have evolved in the GATT/WTO system for many years and through 
a series of negotiation. Before any further discourse on the provisions of SDT can be discussed, 
it is necessary to include a brief account of how SDT has evolved with time. For the purpose 
of this research, only two developmental stages will be distinguished, namely, Pre-Uruguay 
and Post-Uruguay. 
3.3.1 Special and differential treatment before the Uruguay Round 
 In 1957, a panel of experts were appointed by GATT contracting parties to make a report on 
the international trade at the time, with particular focus on the ‘failure of the trade of less 
developed countries to develop as rapidly as that of industrialised countries, excessive short-
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term fluctuations in the primary products and widespread resort to agricultural protection’.204 
Gottfried Haberler, who was the chairman of the panel that was appointed, formulated a report 
which got the Contracting Parties to examine ways in which developing countries could 
achieve greater access in the world markets. The report was called Trends in International 
Trade, also known as the ‘Haberler Report’. The end result of the Haberler Report was that it 
contributed to the introduction of Part IV of GATT. 205 
These arguments which arose from the trade deficits of developing countries brought about the 
creation of the UNCTAD in 1964. this lead to the introduction of Part IV into the GATT, as 
discussed above; and the concept of non-reciprocity as a negotiating strategy for developing 
countries in the Tokyo Round.206 This was an entirely new section that had been included in 
the GATT by 1965, entitled Trade and Development. The significance of Part IV of the GATT 
is that it afforded SDT some legal relevance and recognised the link that existed between trade 
and development.  
It consisted of Article XXXVI through to XXXVIII, which were unfortunately not binding: 
‘Article 36 recognizes the development needs for developing countries, the importance to them 
of improved market access, pride stabilisation, diversification of economic structures and inter-
agency cooperation. It also contains a clear statement of the principle of non-reciprocity, i.e. 
that developing countries should not need to reciprocate trade concessions made to them by 
developed countries in negotiation. Article 37 represents a best efforts commitment (with no 
obligation for action) to the prioritization of products of interest to developing countries in any 
trade liberalization. Article 38 provides for joint developed-developing country actions, citing 
possibilities for action in the commodities field, inter-agency cooperation, possibilities of 
studying the export potential of developing countries and other related issues.’207 
Put simply, Article 36 establishes non-reciprocity, which calls for developed countries to grant 
concessions to developed countries without expecting anything in return. Paragraph 1 of this 
Article also outlines the differences between developing and developed countries and reasons 
why SDT is important for developing countries in the international trade community. It 
recognises that ‘…achieving economic and social advancement should be governed by such 
rules and procedures … as are consistent with the objectives set forth in this Article’. Article 
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37 encourages developed countries to open their markets more for developing countries and 
Article 38 lays out the objectives to be followed by developed countries for granting unilateral 
tariff concessions for developing countries.208 Part IV formed an integral part of the GATT 
1994 as a binding legal instrument however; it was drafted in such a way that implies that the 
regulations are not mandatory. The result of this was that developed countries made very few, 
if any, binding legal commitment to developing countries Part IV.209 
The Tokyo Round which took place from 1973 to 1979 adopted a number of ‘codes’ which 
expanded the regulations under GATT to include technical trade barriers and subsidies.210 
During this Round, the actions of developing countries were heavily aimed at codifying SDT. 
This was after developing countries were disappointed after the Kennedy Round of 1967 which 
did not improve market access for developing countries.211 Nevertheless their expectations 
changed when the Ministerial Declaration that launched the Tokyo Round gave them hope. 
This declaration pointed out one of the goals of this Round, holding that: 
‘[this round would] … secure additional benefits for the international trade of developing 
countries so as to achieve a substantial increase in their foreign exchange earnings, the 
diversification of their exports, the acceleration of the rate of growth of their trade … [and] a 
substantial improvement in the conditions of access for the products of interest to the 
developing countries…’.212 
When the Round took off in 1973, SDT for developing countries amounted to Article 18, 
Article 28 bis (iii) and Part IV. This was an addition to the preferences that existed under GSPs 
which were covered a waiver under Article 25 that was set to expire in 1981, notwithstanding 
the Article I MFN commitment.213 The waiver only affected Article I of the GATT; however, 
this waiver still makes GSP legally possible although it does not obligate developed countries 
to offer tariff preferences to developing countries. This allows flexibility in terms of developed 
countries withdrawing or modifying its GSP program at any given time.214 The concept of 
GSPs was first introduced by UNCTAD in 1964 where ‘developing countries argued that 
preferential tariffs in developed-country imports would have several salutary benefits for 
                                                          
208 Note 122 above at 96. 
209 Note 204 above at 1536. 
210 Note 280 above. 
211 Ibid. 
212 BISD, 20th Supp. 19,20 (1974). 
213 Note 202 above at 476. 
214 Note 204 above at 1540. 
40 
 
developing countries.’215 The implication of this was that ‘developing countries would increase 
their exports, that they would diversify into industries that produce and export high value goods 
and lastly that GSP would decrease their reliance on foreign aid’.216 There are a number of 
criticisms directed at the scope of application of GSPs. It has three basic guiding principles, 
namely generality, non-discrimination and non-reciprocity,217 but because it is entirely 
voluntary, its application becomes uneven. 
The waiver of 1971 under the GSP Decision was not renewed in terms of the Tokyo Round 
Decision upon its conclusion in 1979.218 Interestingly, the Enabling Clause was also adopted 
to regulate opportunities to provide developing countries with preferential tariff treatment.219 
This clause, as the name suggests, enables developed countries to afford preferential tariff 
treatment to developing countries, but does not oblige them to do so. Paragraph 1 of this clause 
holds that ‘notwithstanding the provisions of Article I of the General Agreement, contracting 
parties may accord differential and more favourable treatment to developing countries, without 
according such treatment to other contracting parties’.220 There are four areas in which 
preferential treatment can be afforded to developing countries and Paragraph 2 of the Enabling 
Clause identifies them as the following: 
a) preferential tariff treatment accorded by developed contracting parties to products 
originating in developing countries in accordance with the General System Preferences; 
b) differential and more favourable treatment with respect to the provisions of the General 
Agreement concerning no-tariff measures governed by the provisions of instruments 
multilaterally negotiated under the auspices of the GATT; 
c) regional or global arrangements entered into among less-developed contracting parties 
for the mutual reduction or elimination of tariffs and … of non-tariff measures, on 
products imported from one another; and  
d) special treatment of the least-developed among the developing countries in the context 
of any general or specific measures in favour of developing countries.221 
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Kennedy is of the view that there is a great risk that comes with preferential treatment of 
developing counties as they might harm trade liberalisation efforts among developed 
countries.222 However, the use of preferential treatment is circumscribed under paragraph 3, 
which called for SDT to ‘facilitate and promote the trade of developing countries and not to 
raise barriers or create undue difficulties for the trade of any other contracting parties’.223 This 
paragraph further reiterates that the preferential tariff treatment should not create a barrier to 
multilateral trade liberalisation and for it to respond positively to the developmental needs of 
developing countries.  
The issue of reciprocity in trade concessions is not imposed by the Enabling Clause. Paragraphs 
5 and 6 specifically relieve developing countries from making reciprocal tariff concessions, 
and developed countries must abide by the utmost restraint in expecting concessions from 
developing countries. For example, the AGOA scheme of the US requires that sub-Saharan 
African countries establish the following: ‘a market scheme based economy; the rule of law 
and political pluralism; economic policies to reduce poverty; a system to combat corruption 
and bribery; protection of workers’ rights and elimination of barriers to trade and 
investment.’224 
The Enabling Clause in its application vouches for the GSP preferences but falls short in 
providing a remedy for the failings of the GSP nor does it create any legally binding mandates 
for its use by developed countries insofar as it pertains to SDT. As Michalapoulos holds, the 
Enabling Clause gave a formal voice to the discretionary and permissive nature of SDT; 
however it failed in extending the concept further to make it legally binding.225 
The concept of graduation is brought into play by Paragraph 7 of the Enabling Clause which 
formalises it into a legal concept. This means that developing countries would graduate into 
more legally binding obligations provided their economic and trade situations improved.226 
This paragraph alludes that for graduation from GSP to occur, the economic conditions of 
developed countries should improve which means that ‘they would accordingly expect to 
participate more fully in the framework of rights and obligations under the General 
                                                          
222 Note 204 above at 1543. 
223 Paragraph 3 of the Enabling Clause. 
224 S Garay and Cornejo Rules of Origin and Trade Preferences in Hoekman et al (eds) Development, Trade and 
the WTO: A Handbook (2002) 115. 
225 Note 30 above at 7. 
226 Paragraph 7 of the Enabling Clause. 
42 
 
Agreement’.227 The concept of graduation may have done more harm than good. It begs the 
question of when exactly a developing country should graduate.? Dube argues that while SDT 
is aimed at the improvement of developing countries and therefore carries the graduating 
element, the lack of definitions complicates matters and allows developed countries to be 
discriminatory in their application of GSP preferences.228 
The concept of graduation has created conflicting interests between developing and developed 
countries. While developed countries tried to push developing countries into fuller participation 
in the GATT-WTO system, developing countries resisted. More so, according to Kennedy, 
‘donor developed countries have reminded beneficiary developing countries that preferential 
tariff treatment is neither an end in itself nor is it meant to last in perpetuity’. 229 
At this point, the concept of SDT was generally accepted as an instrument that could be used 
to drive development for developing countries. If the provisions were applied sufficiently and 
effectively, SDT could have easily been an indispensable tool for growth.230 This was 
unfortunately so as a result of the non-binding factor associated to the application of SDT 
provisions by developed countries. In other words, developed countries did not have to assist 
developing countries if they did not want to. The prime reason for such a flaw is the language 
used in the provisions. According to Lichtenbaum, the language fails to direct any action, but 
it merely encourages developed countries to grant preferences to developing countries.231  
Despite the legal content of the SDT provisions being vague, during this period, developing 
countries were trying to make major moves that would guarantee them a trade agenda that 
would move them closer towards development. Before the Uruguay Round, this seemed 
reasonably possible. Here, developing countries were allowed to maintain a certain level of 
protection of their markets; reciprocal trade concessions were not required from them; they 
were permitted to use subsidies to support their exports; the GPS system granted them 
preferential access to developed country markets; and there was a Fund in place for them to 
support their commodity stabilisation schemes.232 The Fund refers to the Common Fund for 
Commodities (CFC) which was established after negotiations with UNCTAD.233 As 
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progressive as this could have turned out to be, Dube firmly holds that ‘where there is an 
expectation of progress with each new trade round, in terms of SDT the Uruguay round was, 
to all intents and purposes, a rolling back of the progress of SDT’.234 
3.3.2 Special and differential treatment after the Uruguay Round 
SDT evolved further from its meaning from this round going forward. From a negotiating point 
of view, there have been a number of significant SDT provisions that were created that 
particularly related to specific agreements under the WTO. Because it will be nearly impossible 
to consider all of them, for the purpose of this paper, focus will be on the Single Undertaking 
Principle. 
The Single Undertaking is of significant importance to the history of the SDT because it 
changed the dynamics of SDT. With the Single Undertaking, developing countries had to adopt 
all trading agreements and policies and according to Ismail, this immensely reduced their space 
for national policy and consequently weakened the SDT provisions.235 The position of SDT 
after the Uruguay Round moved away from the traditional principles of non-reciprocity and 
this stage developing countries were permitted to maintain different levels of obligations to 
what was called ‘limited non-reciprocity’ which meant that reciprocity was qualified by 
different implementation periods.236  
There are a number of reasons why developing countries agreed to succumb to demands of 
developed countries that they adopt a Single Undertaking approach. Firstly, as development 
was a priority in the minds of developing countries, they needed improved market access in 
developed countries market industries such as agriculture and they were consequently willing 
to let go of non-reciprocity for this.237 For developing countries, the Single Undertaking was a 
matter of accepting everything and leaving the GATT system. They also needed to change the 
trading system and remove protectionism, particularly in the agricultural and textile 
industries.238 On the contrary, it was argued that during this period, SDT provisions and 
flexibilities had inadvertently driven developing countries to pursue highly unsuccessful 
development policies which were essentially driven by protectionism and import 
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substitution.239 This was following the constant tariff escalation tactics by developed countries. 
Such escalation hindered the diversification of developing countries industries due to the high 
protection of processed goods.240 
The bargain made by developing countries at this stage was essentially a bad bargain. The 
problem did not resonate in the round itself, but stemmed from the differentiation of 
development that is prevalent among the members of the WTO. Most WTO agreements 
explicitly uphold the interests of developed countries, leaving developing countries lurking on 
the sidelines. To a much more significant extent, the standards encapsulated in the WTO 
agreements start from the status quo of developed countries with the consequence of 
developing countries having to bear the burden of implementation.241 Hence the Single 
Undertaking is considered a bad bargain. Developing countries were effectively excluded when 
this was negotiated, and it had been negotiated only by developed countries. This resulted in a 
great imbalance on top of long-standing imbalances. To cure this defect, the SDT provisions 
were written in almost every agreement of the Uruguay Round. This was done by factoring in 
longer implementation periods as well as technical assistance as way of way helping 
developing countries keep up.  
Despite the remedy provided, developing countries still struggled to implement the obligations 
they took on under the Uruguay agreements. In a study convened by Finger and Schuler of the 
customs valuation agreement, sanitary and phytosanitary agreement standards and intellectual 
property rights, they attempted to examine whether there were any problems with their 
implementation and concluded that given the magnitude of implementation problems, 
unfortunately, extended implementation periods cannot remedy the imbalance.242 The fact that 
the global trading system predominantly prescribes to the needs and interests of developing 
countries may well be the contributing factor to the failure to remedy this imbalance. Although 
a remedy was provided, its ineffectiveness results from the context of the agreement not being 
consistent with economic and developmental needs of developing countries. Again, the 
applicability of SDT raises more concerns. 
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3.4 APPLICATION OF SDT PROVISIONS IN WTO AGREEMENTS 
The single biggest problem with the application of SDT provisions is its implementation. 
Throughout the Uruguay Round, history shows that developing countries cannot take on the 
obligations they assumed, while developed countries have a choice of whether or not to apply 
SDT provisions. Of concern is the failure to enforce SDT provisions afforded for developing 
countries. It characterises a strong legal vacuity and thus cannot be litigated upon.  
The outcomes of the Uruguay Round were supposed to reflect the developmental needs 
developing countries by applying SDT provisions in WTO agreements. There is a more 
detailed journey of how the concept has been applied and evolved throughout the GATT/WTO 
framework, but of particular note for this chapter, focus will be only on the application of SDT 
provisions in the SPS Agreement and TBT Agreement.  
3.4.1 SDT and the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures 
Human, plant and animal life and health fall under the sovereign territory of a country and it is 
the duty of governments to protect them.243 This duty includes employing measures to protect 
human, animal and plant life and health within their territory against any form of risks that can 
be contained in food and agricultural products.244 All these put together are termed sanitary and 
phytosanitary (SPS) measures.245 The idea of offering protection measures is to prevent or limit 
the spread of toxins and create or maintain a disease-free environment. For example, there was 
a ban by many countries in the European Community of beef imports as a result of the outbreak 
of foot-and-mouth disease in 2001. More recently, in March 2017, the South African 
government announced restrictions of red meat imports owing to evidence showing that 
Brazilian meat-packers have been selling ‘rotten and substandard produce’ for several years.246 
SPS measures are an important part of international trade. There will always be a market for 
the trade of food and agricultural products and for as long as that is so SPS measures will have 
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an important impact on international trade.247 However, SPS standards vary from country to 
country as they have to reflect their national priorities, their different stages of economic 
development and consumer preferences.248 These standards can have both negative and 
positive impact countries. Prévost and Van den Bossche describe that ‘the high cost of meeting 
the plethora of health standards means that exporters are forced to charge higher prices for their 
products on the export market or are even completely excluded from this market’.249  
Although the measures and standards selected are based on legitimate concerns about health, 
it is possible for some countries to have suspicious motives behind their standards that could 
possibly lead to disguised barriers of trade. For this reason, the WTO contains rules that 
regulate ‘the conflict between competing goals of trade liberalisation (and thus economic 
growth) and the protection of human, animal and plant health’ which is said ‘to apply equally 
to developed and developing countries’.250 At the same time, the SPS Agreement takes into 
consideration economic and technical deficits faced by developing countries. Prévost adds that 
it is important to factor in the differences in capacity across different levels of development 
and the effectiveness of the SPS Agreement will depend on ‘the ability of countries to comply 
with, and benefit from. Their rules on their starting position’.251  The SPS Agreement reflects 
on this in its Preamble and acknowledges that: 
‘… developing country Members may encounter special difficulties in complying with 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures of importing Members, and as a consequence in 
access to markets, and also in the formulation and application of sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures in their own territories, and desiring to assist them in their endeavours in this 
regard;…’.252 
It seems that this recognition of the different developmental stages between developed and 
developed countries by the SPS Agreement allows the agreement itself to afford developing 
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countries special provisions. As with other agreements of the WTO, these provisions relate to 
technical assistance and SDT in favour of developing countries.  
3.4.1.1 Technical assistance  
Developing countries have a need for technical assistance to ensure that the application and use 
of the SPS Agreement is efficient and beneficial to all. The term overall seems broad, but what 
it requires is for improved understanding by developing countries of the rules and the 
acquisition of technical and scientific capacity that is required for both developed and 
developing countries to adhere to their obligations while also enforcing their rights under the 
agreement.253 To complement the provision of technical assistance for developing countries, 
there are several actors involved, which includes ‘other WTO Members, the WTO Secretariat, 
as well as other international organisations such as the Food and Agricultural Organization 
(FAO) (including Codex and the International Plant Protection Convention), the World Health 
Organization, the World Organization for Animal Health and the World Bank’.254 More 
importantly, for the provision of technical assistance to be effective, the participation and 
contribution of developing countries is vital. 
Under Article 9.1 of the SPS Agreement, Members agree to take on and facilitate the provision 
of technical assistance to developing country Members, which can be done either bilaterally or 
through international organisations. There are various forms in which this assistance can be 
facilitated, such as processing technologies or research and infrastructure, as well as the 
establishment of national regulatory bodies that take various forms including advice, credits, 
and grants and donations.255 Overall this technical assistance and expertise allow countries to 
adjust to, and comply with, SPS measures as relevant for their markets.256 
Further, Article 9.2 deals specifically with the case where substantial investments are put in 
place in order to necessitate an exporting developing country Member to fulfil the SPS 
measures of an importing country Member.257 This means that it would be in the interests of 
an importing Member to provide technical assistance that will permit the developing country 
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Member to maintain and expand its market access opportunities for a specific product.258 Be it 
as it may, this still does not oblige any Member to provide technical assistance. 
As such, to keep technical assistance relevant and effective, there is an SPS Committee where 
documents are compiled and circulated among Members to identify specific fields for technical 
assistance needs by means of a questionnaire in addition to informal discussions held on the 
issue. 259 The DDA also recognises that technical assistance is important as it has the potential 
to enable developing countries to benefit fully from the global trading system.260 In addition to 
this, the General Council for the Joint Communication from the African Group in the WTO 
agreed to establish a facility within a Global Trust Fund for ensuring that: 
a) Developing and least-developed country Members have the financial and technical 
capacity to meet the requirements under the Agreement; 
b) Delegations from developing and least-developed country Members attend and 
effectively participate in meetings of the Committee and relevant international 
standard setting organisations; 
c) Measures adopted under the Agreement do not contravene the rights of developing and 
least-developed country Members.261 
The Committee employed to deal with the SPS Agreement considered a variety of trade 
concerns in 2016. These range from avian influenza and African swine fever to plant pests and 
novel foods.262 There have been 416 trades concerned since the establishment of the WTO in 
1995, but there have been only 148 reported solutions by WTO members of these issues,263 and 
a partial resolution has been reported for another 32 issues.264 This means that not all those 
raising the trade concern have accepted the solution, or a solution has not been found for all 
the products at issue.265 In total, about 43 percent of the issues have been reported with partial 
or complete solutions since 1995, while the remaining 57 percent have not reported a 
solution.266 
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As such, there were three meetings held by the Committee on SPS Measures in 2016 which 
dealt with specific trade concerns. The most recent and important trade concerns reported are: 
‘Namibia’s concerns over South Africa’s revised veterinary health certificates for cattle, sheep 
and goats; Israel’s concerns over Costa Rica’s regulation on pesticides and related substances; 
Brazil’s concerns over EU restrictions on exports of pork from the state of Santa Catarina; EU 
concern relating to China’s import restrictions due to Schmallenberg Virus and Highly 
Pathogenic Avian Influenza; and Russia’s import restrictions on certain animal products from 
Germany’.267 
SPS measures are fluid and therefore health requirement are constantly changing. To help 
developing countries keep up with these measures, notifications are sent to inform trading 
partners of coming changes in the importing member’s requirements, provided it is not an 
urgent health protection issue. 
3.4.1.2 Special and differential treatment 
In the SPS Agreement, SDT provisions are aimed at ensuring that developing countries and 
their special needs are considered when it comes to the implementation of provisions under the 
agreement. How this works is that certain provisions that developing countries cannot keep up 
with will be implemented in a more favourable manner, this is in addition to flexibility in the 
provisions contained in the SPS Agreement for developing countries.268  
Under Article 10.1 Members are obliged to take into account the special needs of developing 
country Member and least-developed countries in particular. However, this does not oblige 
developed countries to alter the SPS measure to cater for developing country needs. Prévost 
and Van den Bossche characterise this as the ‘best endeavour’ obligation.269 This means that 
developed countries must use all efforts necessary to fulfil the obligation. However, on the 
contrary, although the provision states that Member ‘shall take account of the special needs of 
developing country Members’, Garcia points out that ‘shall is the classic word of binding 
obligation in international treaties, but since take account of is not defined, the provision by 
itself attains no binding substantive legal effect’.270 
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Article 10.2 allows for the phased introduction of new sanitary or phytosanitary measures. 
Without obliging Members, it encourages them to allow longer time-frames for compliance on 
products of interest to developing countries in order to maintain export opportunities for 
them.271 
Interestingly, the SPS Committee can grant developing countries specific time-limited 
exemptions, on request, from all or some of their obligations under the SPS Agreement as 
provided for by Article 10.3. The aim of which is to enable developing countries to comply 
with their obligations, while taking into account their financial, trade and development 
needs.272 
Article 10.4 states that Members should encourage and facilitate the active participation of 
developing country Members in the relevant international organisations. Considering how 
developing country participation has been in the past, the issue of their participation under this 
provision is onerous. This shift to the participation of developing countries in numerous 
committees of international organisations, especially where standards are developed and 
proposed to be adopted is contentious. Not only does it require financial and human resources, 
it also requires technical expertise to formulate positions regarding standards of interests to the 
country.273 Of course this has improved over the years, with increased active participation of 
developing countries in international organisations.  
3.4.1.3 Transitional periods 
Another form of special treatment granted for developing countries is transitional periods. 
Article 14 of the SPS allowed for the delayed implementation of the obligations under the 
agreement for developing and least-developed countries. This granted them a five-year period, 
from the time the WTO Agreement came into force, for the delayed implementation of their 
obligations. The period for delayed implementation subsequently ended in January 2000.274 
3.4.2 SDT and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
The Agreement of Technical Barriers to Trade (otherwise known as the TBT Agreement) 
ensures that technical regulations and standards, as well as the process of assessing conformity 
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procedures, which play a vital role, do not generate needless obstacles to trade.275 Technical 
regulations, standards and conformity assessment procedures play a vital role on a daily 
basis.276 This Uruguay Round Agreement allows WTO Members to pursue what they have 
agreed on in terms of legitimate regulatory and standardisation interests, in addition to trying 
to ensure that the regulations and standards do not interfere with international trade in goods.277 
The TBT Agreement also makes the stages of formulating, implementing and applying 
technical regulations, and conformity assessment procedures become more transparent for 
Members to be aware of the regulations and standards present in other Members’ jurisdictions 
in order to fuel development and assess their application.278  
Like the SPS Agreement, the TBT Agreement prefers international standards. However, TBT 
does not require a scientific justification that brings about strict requirements.279 However, its 
application requires a certain level of sensitivity. Appleton cautions: 
‘If the TBT Agreement is applied too strictly, the legitimate policy interests of Members will 
be thwarted. If the TBT Agreement is applied too laxly, technical regulations may be used for 
protectionist purposes and the gains of Members have achieved through progressive rounds of 
tariff reductions may be lost.’280 
The sensitivity of applying the TBT Agreement is especially important for developing 
countries as for such countries, technical regulations and standards imposed by developed 
countries for their social policy goals may feed their protectionist desires.281 Moreover, 
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developed countries fear that the strict application of the TBT Agreement will result in trade 
measures which are designed to pursue legitimate social policy objectives being struck 
down.282 
3.4.2.1 Technical assistance 
Article 11 of the TBT Agreement puts forward numerous technical assistance provisions. These 
provisions require WTO Members to: 
a) Advise other members, especially developing country Members, on the preparation of 
technical assistance; 
b) Grant technical assistance, especially for developing country Members, on mutually 
agreed terms and conditions regarding the establishment of national standardising 
bodies and participation in these bodies, and encourage their national standardisation 
bodies to do likewise; 
c) Take reasonable measures as may be available to them to arrange for the regulatory 
bodies within their territories, in particular developing country Members; 
d) Take reasonable measures in respect of developing countries to advise on the 
establishment of bodies for the establishment of conformity with standards; 
e) Grant technical assistance regarding the steps that should be taken by foreign producers 
seeking access to conformity assessment systems operated by governmental and non-
governmental bodies;  
f) Members or participants of international or regional systems for conformity 
assessment shall grant technical assistance on mutually agreed terms and conditions 
regarding the establishment of the institutions and legal framework which would 
enable them to fulfil the obligations of membership or participation in such systems; 
g) Grant developing country Members technical assistance on the institutions and legal 
framework of international and regional systems for conformity assessment sufficient 
to enable them to fulfil the obligations of membership or participation in such systems; 
h) To give priority to the needs of developed countries.283 
This agreement has the benefit of creating unnecessary technical complications to international 
trade and therefore contributes in ensuring that trade runs smoothly and efficiently. The fact 
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that it promotes transparency is a big bonus for developing countries as it limits the adoption 
of protectionist measures. 
3.4.2.2 Special and differential treatment 
 Article 12 of the TBT Agreements sets forth the provisions necessary for special and 
differential treatment of developing countries. Under Article 12, Members are required to: 
a) Pay specific attention to the provisions of this Agreement in as much as it concerns the 
rights of developing countries; 
b) Take into account the special developmental, financial and trade needs of developing 
country Members when implementing the TBT Agreement at a national level; 
c) Ensure that technical regulations, standards and conformity assessment procedures do 
not create unnecessary obstacles to exports from developing countries. This should be 
done by taking into account the special, developmental, financial and trade needs of 
developing countries in the preparation and application of technical regulations, 
standards and conformity assessment procedures; 
d) Bear in mind the special difficulties of developing countries during consultations by 
formulating and implementing standards and technical regulations and conformity 
assessment procedures. 284 
Article 12 of the TBT Agreement fails to grant developing countries with permanent 
derogations to the substantive provisions of its agreement and Appleton holds that ‘the pro-
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developing country character of Article 12 is unambiguous although not particularly 
meaningful’.285 Again, this stems from the flawed nature of SDT provisions which are not 
binding and will probably be unenforceable. Of all the nine provisions under Article 12 that 
relate to SDT, they take only four forms, which are to: 
1) Recognise and take into account the special needs of developing countries; 
2) Facilitate the participation of developing countries; 
3) Provide technical assistance; and  
4) Grant time-limited exceptions. 
As has been highlighted throughout the chapter, the principal concern in international trade is 
the conflicting interests between developed and developing countries. Moreover, with regard 
to the TBT Agreement, there is a substantial amount of mistrust in many developing countries 
of the trade measures taken by developed countries for protectionist purposes. Notwithstanding 
the fact that the TBT Agreement contains provisions that favour developing countries, it is still 
very critical to evaluate whether the provisions governing SDT are both efficient and 
effective.286 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter carried out a definitive analysis of the SDT provisions and the extent to which 
they are applied in the two selected WTO Agreements to determine whether or not the 
application of SDT provisions contributes to the inferior treatment of developing countries in 
the global trading system. Simply put, the SDT provisions do contribute to the inferior 
treatment of developing countries, and they invariably uphold the interests of developed 
countries. SDT provisions as they now stand immensely hinder developing countries’ attempts 
to participate actively in the international trading system with other countries. Contrary, in fact, 
to the spirit of the SDT provisions, they restrict the full potential and benefits for developing 
countries. Finally, the fact that the SDT provisions cannot be enforced and litigated upon leaves 
the fate of developing countries dependent on the discretion of developed countries.  
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CHAPTER FOUR:  
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL  
TRADE COMMUNITY 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The Doha Round of Negotiations is grounded on the theory of development. This round is 
primarily intended to deliver to the development needs of developing countries and the fact 
that it was labelled the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) further raised the expectations and 
objectives of this round. Although development is often said to bear some association to 
civilisation, the two are not synonymous. According to Adibe, ‘development understood in the 
modern sense refers to better living standards and the availability of resources that make life 
easier and more enjoyable’.287 On an international trade scale, a big part of the problem is that 
many developing countries are not well equipped to fully enjoy the benefits and opportunities 
of global trade. This makes the outcome of the Doha Round significant for developing 
countries. 
As such, the chapter aims to determine the extent in which SDT upholds the interests of 
developing and developed countries? More so, if there is a way in which SDT can be 
effectuated to ensure that developing countries reap the benefits of the global trading system 
as envisioned by the objectives of the WTO. To answer this, this chapter will review the most 
recent and current developments since the inception of the Doha Round. Trade and 
development are important themes through this round as it is aimed to fuel economic growth 
and development. The association between both trade and development will be analysed 
through the framework of SDT. 
4.2 LAUNCHING THE DOHA DEVELOPMENT AGENDA  
During the 1960s, there were overwhelming social and socio-economic problems such as 
poverty, unemployment and unfair income distribution, which were increased significantly  by 
the high rates of economic growth in developing countries.288 It is not clear what poverty means 
in the international trade context apart from measuring it according to the countries’ Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP). A relevant question that needs to be determined is how poverty or 
                                                          
287 E Adibe World Trade Organization (WTO): Trade Rules/Agreements and Developing Countries. NAUJILI 
(2013) 121. 
288 Note 166 above at 109. 
56 
 
the eradication thereof relate to development?289 Pahuja strongly opines that ‘when we talk 
about the persistence of global poverty, the solution is still always development’.290 Wiarda 
makes an observation that economic growth is necessary to provide for investment for future 
growth and pay for social services.291 This is to say that economic growth and development are 
mutually exclusive; however, Wiarda further adds that ‘economic growth is a sine quo non for 
development’.292 Therefore plans to achieve any form of development should be altered to 
include economic growth and socio-economic issues.293 In addition to this, it should equally 
consider ‘political, social and legal development’.294 
One of the platforms used to try to address the economic growth and development issues was 
through to UN’s implementation of the Millennium Development Goals and Targets (MDGs). 
This was created due to the increasing global awareness of worldwide poverty.295 The MDGs 
are aimed at developing a global partnership for development by establishing open trading and 
furthering a financial system that is rule-based, predictable, and non-discriminatory.296 
After much need for the system to change in order to incorporate more sustainable development 
within the global trade community, new international trade negotiations were launched, known 
as the Doha Development Agenda (DDA).297 This Ministerial Conference is the first round of 
multilateral trade negotiations to ‘explicitly focus on the development dimension of world 
trade.’298 The Ministerial Declaration of Doha Round outlines the main aim as the following: 
‘International trade can play a major role in the promotion of economic development and the 
alleviation of poverty. We recognize the need for all our peoples to benefit from the increased 
opportunities and welfare gains that the multilateral trading system generates. The majority of 
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the WTO Members are developing countries. We seek to place their needs and interests at the 
heart of the Work programme adopted in this Declaration. Recalling the Preamble of the 
Marrakesh Agreement, we shall continue to make positive efforts designed to ensure that 
developing countries, and especially the least-developed among them, secure a share in the 
growth of the world trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development. In this 
context, enhanced market access, balanced rules, and well-targeted, sustainability financed 
technical assistance and capacity-building programmes have important roles to play.’299 
After the Uruguay Round of negotiations that stretched over eight years, leading to the 
seemingly successful launch of the WTO, why, then, was there a need for the Doha Round? 
Apart from the need to negotiate on international trade issues, Cho strongly holds that ‘[t]he 
UR (Uruguay Round) could not effectively address rich countries’ longstanding 
protectionism…’.300 Another big problem, as previously stressed, are the implementation 
issues. These include palpable difficulties experienced by developing countries in their 
implementation of Uruguay Round commitments. Furthermore, developing countries grew 
more frustrated with the inadequacy of rich countries’ implementation of commitments in areas 
such as agriculture and textiles.301 Developing countries then resorted to voicing their 
frustration regarding the uneven distribution of the Uruguay Round benefits between 
themselves and developed countries.302 This was approached with importance in the Doha 
Declaration, stating that ‘we attach the utmost importance to the implementation-related issues 
and concerns raised by Members and are determined to find appropriate solutions to them’.303 
Notably, before the Doha Round was launched, there were major disparities between developed 
and developing countries and the Ministers of Member countries were nowhere near a 
resolution at their first meeting at Doha in November 2001.304 The fear that an agreement on a 
new round of negotiations would fail was borne in the minds of many countries. For this reason, 
the conclusion of the Doha meeting included a declaration stating that: 
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‘[w]e hereby undertake [a] broad and balanced work programme … that incorporates both an 
expanded negotiating agenda and other important decisions and activities necessary to address 
the challenges facing the multilateral trading system’.305 
There is a strong argument regarding the reason behind the successful launch of the Doha 
Round. Srinivasan proposes an argument that the terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre in 
New York on 11 September 2001 was one of the factors that contributed to the launch of the 
Doha Round.306 The basis of his argument stems from the fact that there were frustrations with 
the lack of development; the attack was launched; and this subsequently led developed 
countries to be more understanding of developing countries’ concerns and thus label the new 
round as a ‘development’ round.307 This was indeed an urgent call from the international 
community for the trade system to maintain development and reduce poverty actively.308 
However, this is not the only reason that led to the launch of the Doha Round. There had been 
many calls for some form of change to occur insofar as development is concerned. According 
to international development organisations, it was in the best interests of developed countries 
to contribute towards poverty reduction and economic growth and development in developing 
countries as this will discourage social unrest and maintain global peace.309 
The DDA had extremely high hopes on fuelling development; however, the negotiations were 
clouded by the longstanding challenges of finding a fair compromise between WTO members, 
particularly developed and developing country members.310 ‘Development is the banner of the 
Doha Round’ as Dube puts it.311 This was so labelled with the intention of feeding the 
development needs of developing countries. However, despite development being the constant 
thread through the Doha Round, there is no standard definition attached to it.312 This becomes 
problematic in determining to what extent the development needs and interests of both 
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developed and developing countries are being upheld. In addition to this, what is also not 
explained is what is being done to ensure the complaints of developing countries are adhered 
to, particularly regarding provisions contrary to their development needs. These needs differ 
among different developing countries (although it must be noted that there are some issues that 
they all have in common), is the development agenda as proposed by the Doha Round flexible 
enough to cater for a plethora of development needs of developing countries? This assumption 
is based on the fact that some developing countries and least-developed countries’ economic 
situations hinder them from fully exploiting the benefits of international trade and therefore 
fail to fairly complete in the world market.313 
In the quest to fully understand the concept of development and how it can be bought about, 
Pahuja makes an observation that:  
‘[i]n the context of international law and development, though, this judgement is reversed once 
more. Interventions directed at bringing about “development” are assessed primarily by 
reference to the intentions of the “developer”, rather than the effect of those actions on the 
“developing”. This is exacerbated by the way in which accountability measures usually involve 
accountability to the donors, not to the subjects of developmental interventions. In other words, 
we, in the rich world, assess ourselves, and base that assessment on our intentions’.314 
This is significant in showing upholding of interests can be skewed more in favour of developed 
countries as opposed to developing countries. 
According to Schwartz, the meaning of development is that it is an ideology that is readily 
functional in a way that is compatible political mobilisation.315 The idea of development in the 
pre-Doha Round era has evolved. Integrating developing countries in the world trading system 
by reducing barriers and creating a more ‘liberal global environment for trading, finance, and 
technological progress’, which were intended to hasten their growth and development.316 For 
this to be done effectively, Srinivasan opines that it is imperative not to ignore the domestic 
constraints of developing countries such as their social and economic structure. If the WTO 
wants to create a situation where countries can seize the opportunities of growth and 
development, then it needs to work on removing domestic barriers of developed countries as 
well.317 The demands of all developing countries are not aligned because they have different 
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economic, social and political structures that influence their demands. Therefore, some 
demands of developing countries may not be in the interests of all the other developing 
countries as a group.318 Effectively, this is evidence that the ‘one size fits all’ approach to 
development by the DDA is flawed and cannot accurately represent and cater to the demands 
and needs of different developing countries. 
Although the Doha Round is premised on development issues and concerns raised by 
developing countries, the concept of development is nothing new to the WTO and therefore 
this round and the Uruguay Round should not be looked at in isolation.319 As mentioned above, 
both these rounds were confronted with conflict between developed and developing countries 
on a number of issues.320 The objective of the Doha Round’s incorporation of development 
into its agenda is actually nothing new to the WTO.321 The underlying rationale of SDT 
illustrates the prevalence of development objectives through the WTO. There have been many 
noted loopholes under the SDT provisions and it is thus not sufficiently adequate to address 
fully the development needs of developing countries. In essence, the WTO has a major desire 
to fulfil its development objectives, but does not seem well-equipped to carry them through.  
A further argument that has been proffered is that perhaps the Doha Round was also launched 
to remedy the deficiencies of development objectives under the WTO. According to Bhandari, 
‘negotiators seemed jubilant about delivering the expected outcome of the development round. 
However, before long the jubilation was overwhelmed by suspicion and contradiction’.322 As 
set out in paragraph two of the Doha Ministerial Declaration, the DDA seeks to address the 
association between trade and development. However, Bhandari notes a material aspect that 
was not taken into consideration when the round started, stating that: 
‘[w]hen the Doha Round was launched, it is probable that no one had pondered the challenging 
nature of the political economy of trade and development negotiations. The challenges 
overwhelmed the negotiators, especially because negotiations had been driven by domestic 
political interests over trade issues, and they had been conducted using a weak methodology’.323 
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As a result of this, the Doha Round has been ongoing since 2001 to date, despite it being 
anticipated to be grandest round in the history of international trade. There is still no tangible 
sign of when the round might be concluded and according to Bhandari, the reason the 
negotiations are prolonged is because of the reluctance of key role players to liberalise their 
markets as well as the ‘give and take’ approach between negotiating parties employed in its 
methodology.324 
4.3 SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT UNDER THE DOHA 
DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 
The SDT issues under the WTO, coupled with their implementation issues are important to the 
development aspect of the Doha Round and its DDA mandate.325 The Doha Ministerial 
Conference emphasised the importance of SDT provisions as an integral part of the WTO and 
there was a plan to ‘take fully into account the principle of special and differential treatment 
embodied in Part IV of the GATT 1994 … and all other relevant WTO provisions’.326 
Paragraph 2 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration makes provision for the enhancement of 
market access, balanced rules, technical assistance and capacity building programmes that 
ensure that developing countries have increased opportunities in multilateral trading gains. This 
provision is undoubtedly premised on development -the main mandate of the Doha Round.  
The foremost problem that has been stressed continuously insofar as SDT is concerned, is its 
implementation issue. On this, the Doha Ministerial Declaration provides that ‘we attach the 
utmost importance to the implementation-related issues and concerns by Members and are 
determined to find appropriate solutions to them’.327  
The Doha Ministerial Declaration also recognises technical cooperation/assistance and 
capacity building as core elements to achieve development in the multilateral trading system.328 
However technical assistance is limited for the use of developing countries only and LDCs in 
assisting them to adjust to WTO rules and obligations.329 
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Furthermore, the Doha Ministerial Declaration provides that Members reaffirm that the SDT 
provisions form part of an integral part of the WTO agreements.330 Furthermore, the 
Declaration notes the ‘concerns expressed regarding their operation in addressing specific 
constraints faced by developing countries, particularly least-developed countries’.331 The 
Declaration further agrees that all SDT provisions shall be reviewed with the intention of 
‘strengthening them and making them more precise, effective and operational’.332 For this 
reason, a work programme on SDT is set out in the Decision on Implementation-Related Issues 
and Concerns.333 This decision instructs the Committee on Trade and Development to: 
a) Consider SDT provisions that are non-binding in nature and consider the legal and 
practical implications for developed and developing country Members when 
converting these provisions into mandatory provisions.  
b) Examine additional ways in which SDT provisions can be more effective and 
improved ways in which developing countries and LDCs may be assisted to make 
best use of SDT provisions. 
c) Consider how SDT provisions may be incorporated into the architecture of WTO 
rules.334 
This shows that the Doha Round had a precise plan of action on how it intended to achieve its 
development goals. The Doha Round identified that the application of SDT provisions falls 
short of their intended objectives as well as the objectives of the WTO. The non-binding factor 
of the SDT provisions was one of the stumbling blocks to its effective implementation. 
However, the Doha Round recognised this problem and incorporated a potential solution into 
its mandate to ensure that SDT provisions are not only effective, but mandatory too.  
Years of negotiations went by and revealed deep divisions between members of the WTO 
regarding the appropriate scope of SDT and a suitable way to achieve the Doha Mandate.335 
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There were 88 proposals made by developing countries, many of which were African, LDC 
and ‘Like-Minded’336 groups.337 Their demands were broken down into the following: 
1) Better preferential access to markets; 
2) Greater freedom to use trade restrictions; 
3) Greater freedom to delay or refrain from adoption of WTO rules or policy principles; 
4) Proposals relating to development aid and technical assistance for implementation; and  
5) Calls for greater transparency and accountability on the part of industrialised country 
membership of the WTO for achieving SDT objectives.338 
The proposals were essentially about changing the best-endeavours language of SDT 
provisions to ensure that developed countries obligations are mandatory and weakening 
substantive WTO disciplines.339 Hoekman argues that considering that Part IV entails is outside 
the control of developed countries, it was expected that they would object to suggestions to 
make SDT obligations mandatory.340 The Economist members of the WTO did not make any 
prominent arguments during negotiations, but argued that ‘insofar as the economics of the 
disciplines embodied in many WTO agreements are sound, many of the proposals to weaken 
their reach are unlikely to benefit developing countries.’341  
From a development perspective, discussions on SDT were unusual because their focus was 
not on whether SDT proposals during negotiations had a development merit. According to 
Hoekman, ‘proposals were not objected to so much because they would not do much good to 
the country or group proposing them, but because they would impose negative externalities’.342 
On the issue of waivers of Article I of the GATT regarding the MFN principle, Paraguay argued 
that they should not be used to accord privileges to other developing countries, while at the 
same time discriminating against other developing countries.343 Instead, they should apply to 
all developing countries as this would be in line with the Enabling Clause and its provisions.344 
If it did not apply to all developing countries, Paraguay suggested that the developed country 
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that provided a preference should provide compensation to the excluded developing country.345 
There is no doubt that the adoption of this proposal might have been controversial, or at the 
very worst rejected, by most developed countries. Hoekman shows how developed countries 
would manipulate this to work well in their favour. He holds that in practice, developed 
countries would be prepared to accept export subsidies from LDCs only because they were 
unlikely to cause serious problems to their own industries and not because this would be 
beneficial from a development point of view.346  
There was no progressive conclusion on the SDT negotiations in the Doha Round, at least not 
on all issues and concerns raised. However, this was not the end of the road for the development 
agenda of the Doha Round.  
4.4 THE BALI MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE 
After much difficulty to bring the Doha Round to a conclusion, the Bali Ministerial Conference 
was launched to restore hope of coming to a successful conclusion of the development agenda, 
as initially proposed. In December 2013 in Bali, Indonesia, the Ministers met for the Ninth 
Session. The so-called Bali package was warmly welcomed by many governments and was 
seen as a way to restore the credibility of the WTO as a negotiating forum and ultimately close 
the Doha Round.347 The issues that formed part of the Bali Package were trade facilitation as 
the biggest one and other issues related to development, including cotton, food security in 
developing countries, and other provisions specifically for LDCs.348 
The outcome of the Bali Ministerial Conference brought forth two important developments to 
the DDA. Firstly, trade ministers were now able to reach a final agreement without being bound 
to a Single Undertaking agreement which entails that ‘nothing is agreed until everything is 
agreed’.349 According to Liang ‘this by itself is a significant political breakthrough, and should 
provide at least a tenuous start to future DDA negotiations’.350 Secondly, the final agreement 
on Trade Facilitation was reached. 
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The Director General of the WTO was really pleased with the outcome of this round. In his 
speech, he said ‘for the first time in our history: the WTO has truly delivered’.351 This was truly 
a milestone, considering how long the DDA has been in existence. He further said that ‘with 
the Bali package you have reaffirmed not just your commitment to the WTO — but also to the 
delivery of the Doha Development Agenda’.352 
There were some concerns, however, as some countries felt that the primacy that was being 
given to trade facilitation in this round would shift or water down the emphasis and focus on 
development.353 However, development remained a huge priority for Bali, and it was still able 
to put specific focus on the needs of developing countries. According to Narlikar and 
Priyasarshi the agenda at the Bali Ministerial Conference was narrow enough to maintain 
significant focus on development issues, while at the same time re-engaging influential 
stakeholders in the developed countries.354 
4.4.1 The Trade Facilitation Agreement 
The dictionary of trade policy terms defines trade facilitation as the ‘simplification and 
harmonisation of international trade procedures aimed at minimising obstacles to the 
movement of goods across borders.’355 Yean narrowly defines trade facilitation as: 
‘[t]he improving of cross-border administrative measures or more broadly to include behind-
the-border measures such as infrastructure, institutional transparency, good governance, and 
domestic regulations. All these measures affect trade costs and with it the trade performance of 
a country’.356 
With the environment rapidly changing and technology becoming more advanced, there is a 
serious need for ‘reliable, high-speed delivery systems’ as Hoekman and Kostecki put it, in 
order to keep up with today’s global business.357 Given the nature of international trade, it is 
important to have a fast, effective and advanced supply chain system that will simplify 
international trade procedures instead of having to rely on border controls and related 
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administrative and documentary requirements that are both costly and time consuming.358 Put 
simply, trade facilitation is involves all procedures necessary to facilitate trade.  
Although there are no provisions under the WTO Agreement that deal explicitly with trade 
facilitation, the Trade Facilitation Agreement states in its Preamble the desire to ‘to clarify and 
improve relevant aspects of Articles V, VIII and X of the GATT 1994.’359 These provisions 
deal with treatment of goods in transit, fees and formalities and requiring transparency of 
national trade regulations respectively. The Trade Facilitation Agreement was adopted from 
the Agreement on Customs Valuation particularly on antidumping and on subsidies and 
countervailing measures and other agreements and subsequently modified them to fit the rapid 
advances of the global business environment. This was done through the by extension of 
disciplines on matters addressed in articles V, VIII and X of the GATT 1994.360 
Trade facilitation was first put on the trade negotiations agenda at the Singapore Ministerial 
Conference in 1996 following demands for more comprehensive rules to facilitate trade.361 No 
agreement was reached on this matter, which was likely influenced by developing countries 
scepticism about negotiating on the subject due to the potential implementation costs which 
they would incur should the agreement come into force.362 Some of the arguments against this 
were that some governments were not equipped well enough to modernise customs procedures, 
while others were reluctant to take on legal obligations that would potentially increase their 
exposure to WTO disputes.363 On the contrary, developed countries were looking to establish 
binding norms within the WTO on this matter; and, of course, many developing countries opted 
for more voluntary and legally non-binding commitments.364 Although no agreement was 
reached at this time, it highlighted the need for trade facilitation; hence it was tabled at every 
subsequent meeting after this, until it was adopted at the Bali Ministerial Conference in 2013. 
As such, the Trade Facilitation Agreement of the WTO was concluded at the Bali Ministerial 
Conference in 2013 and finally came into force on 22 February 2017. It is the first ever 
multilateral trade agreement to be reached since the Uruguay Round.365 The Agreement 
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consists of only two sections. The first section consists of thirteen articles and it deals with both 
substantive and procedural measures on availability of information, facilitated customs 
procedures, border cooperation, and dispute resolution. Section two deals with SDT provisions 
as they apply to developing countries and LDCs. This section is further divided into three 
categories with different implementation and notification standards in each category.366 
The Trade Facilitation Agreement applies only to country Members who have signed and 
agreed to its adoption. What is interesting is that most provisions under this agreement are 
legally binding, with the word “shall” being used throughout the Agreement. Hassan explains 
that ‘the fact that most of the commitments will not be on a “best endeavour” basis makes it a 
strong legally binding agreement’.367 The implementation of these legally binding provisions 
will officially take off once developing countries as well as LDCs have fulfilled their transition 
periods.368  
4.5 THE NAIROBI MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE 
From 15 to 19 December 2015, the Tenth Ministerial Conference of the WTO was held in 
Nairobi, Kenya. This Ministerial Conference is one for the books as it was the first Ministerial 
Conference ever to be held on African soil. Although it was merely a continuation of the 
longstanding and complex DDA, it was not business as usual. The complexities of the Doha 
Round from its inception in 2001 were carried through to the Nairobi Ministerial Conference. 
However, Froman was adamant that ‘Nairobi will mark the end of an era’.369 To achieve this, 
Froman stressed that ‘what cannot be achieved in Nairobi will not be achieved by trying again 
with the same failed approach’.370  
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The Nairobi Ministerial Conference highlighted its intention to continue with the development 
goal of the DDA by reaffirming that it is committed to make more positive efforts towards 
development in order to ensure that developing countries and LDCs have a fair share of the 
world trade growth that is consistent with their development needs.371  
The most important conversation during this conference was the role of the WTO in the 
negotiations which will in turn lead to the fate of the DDA. Although it seems as though the 
role of the WTO in multilateral trade negotiations may be different from the consideration of 
specific issues under the DDA, they are in fact largely connected. To this effect the Nairobi 
Ministerial Declaration focused on the WTO as a global trading forum, stating: 
‘We reaffirm the pre-eminence of the TWTO as the global forum for trade rules setting and 
governance. We acknowledge the contribution that the rules-based multilateral trading system 
has made to the strength and stability of the global economy. We reaffirm the value of our 
consistent practice of taking decisions through a transparent, inclusive, consensus-based, 
Member-driven process.’372  
The Nairobi Ministerial Declaration regrettably failed to reaffirm the DDA and its mandate 
specifically.373 It is rather contradictory in its approach insofar as the DDA and its mandate are 
concerned. Under paragraph 32 of the Declaration, it acknowledges that many Members 
reaffirm the DDA as well as the Declaration and Decisions adopted at Doha. In the same 
paragraph, it claims that other Members believe new approaches are necessary to achieve a 
more successful outcome and therefore do not reaffirm the Doha mandate. Furthermore, the 
Nairobi Declaration made provision for WTO members to bring new issues to the table if they 
so wish beyond those under the DD. However, this is subject to consensus on this being 
reached.374 
This is a major compromise reached under the Nairobi Declaration and may have negative 
implications attached to it. The first consequence of raising new issues is that the issues 
contained under the DDA run the risk of not being resolved, despite already being deadlocked. 
At the same time, Kanade makes a simple formulation of the consequence, stating that this 
Declaration has ‘provided developed countries with legal justification for elevating non-Doha 
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issues to the same level of Doha levels’.375 Another consequence resulting from this 
Declaration is that it provides developed countries with the opportunity ‘to claim that the DDA 
is dead and buried and it is time to move on to further liberalisation’.376 
Despite the Nairobi Declaration seemingly making an already bad situation worse, paragraph 
31 tries to salvage the can of worms it has opened, holding that: 
‘[n]evertheless, there remains a strong commitment of all Members to advance negotiation on 
the remaining Doha issues. This includes advancing work in all three pillars of agriculture, 
namely domestic support, market access and export competition, as well as non-agriculture 
market access, services, development, TRIPS and rules’. 
The Ministerial Conference was concluded with a Ministerial Declaration377 and the Nairobi 
Package,378 which comprised a series of decisions on six Ministerial Decisions. Among them 
were decisions on agriculture, cotton and issues relating to LDCs.379 On the outcome of this 
round, Wilkinson holds that the Nairobi outcome will rekindle the multilateral system. 
However, in the absence of mandatory obligations, there is still very little to force developing 
countries to prioritise negotiations that are of specific interest to developing countries.380 
4.6 CASE STUDIES  
It is important to make an observation on how developing countries and LDCs, African 
countries in particular, manage their participation in the WTO. These case studies make an 
analysis on the extent to which developing countries have been integrated into the global 
trading system and whether they are able to benefit meaningfully from such participation. 
According to Gallagher, being a member of the WTO and taking advantage of that membership 
is not the sole responsibility of the government; instead, it also requires the participation of 
different stakeholders in the economy such as goods and services producers, industry 
associations, consumer associations, civil society groups, and academic analysts.381 
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4.6.1 Kenyan flowers 
When the Marrakesh Agreement was signed in 1994, Kenya was among the founding members 
of the WTO.382 Therefore, as a member, Kenya is a signatory to all WTO Agreements.383 The 
country’s participation in the WTO is largely prominent in the agriculture sector as it forms a 
big part of their economy and produces the country’s major exports.384 One such industry is 
the cut flower trade, which is governed by the WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) 
because flowers fall within its scope of ‘products of agriculture’.385 Kenya is part of the East 
African Community (EAC) which is a regional intergovernmental organisation which is said 
to be one of the fast growing regional economic blocs in the world.386 
The cut flower industry in Kenya is among one of the fastest growing sectors of its economy, 
but like any other developing country, Kenya has issues formulating effective trade policies.387 
Despite this, and as part of the founding members of the WTO, Kenya has made remarkable 
progress in WTO matters and it has built structures that make it easier to implement WTO 
agreements.388 Kenya’s participation in the WTO has been successfully carried through in all 
major WTO trade negotiations,389 and its active participation as a WTO member could have 
possibly led to the decision for it to host the Tenth Ministerial Conference in 2015. 
As such, trade policies in Kenya are created and influenced by internal demands that are usually 
initiated by individuals or institutions.390 The WTO is an external influence that shapes and 
determines the trade policy in Kenya and as part of compliance with WTO obligations, it 
requires that there be a trade policy document.391 As a developing country, Kenya has been 
receiving assistance since 1998 under the Joint Integrated Technical Assistance Programme for 
Selected Least-Developed and other African Countries (JITAP) as part of the technical co-
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operation and capacity building facility of the WTO, which works under the sponsorship of the 
International Trade Centre (ITC) and the UNCTAD.392 These institutions have played a 
fundamental role in making the multilateral trade system in the private and public sector well-
known in Kenya.393 
4.6.2 South African citrus exports 
South Africa underwent dramatic social and political turmoil during the 1990s and this clashed 
with the final stages on the Uruguay Round negotiations establishing the WTO.394 The political 
order in South Arica under the apartheid that deliberately excluded that black majority from 
political participation had adverse consequences for the country’s participation in the global 
trading community. According to Erasmus, ‘the consequence was domestic destabilisation, an 
inability to function as a normal member of the international economy and becoming the prime 
target for sanctions’.395 These sanctions affected South Africa’s international political standing, 
and this also affected its ability to trade, borrow and participate in international 
organisations.396 
South Africa eventually resolved its political problems through negotiations that led to a 
democratic rule in April 1994 which normalised the state and society.397 This political change 
was imperative for South Africa from an international trade perspective. Apart from the rioting 
that took place in the country as a way of revolting against the apartheid system, the costs of 
sanctions in South Africa became incredibly unbearable.398 These sanctions affected South 
Africa’s international political standing and its ability to trade and participate in international 
organisations.399 Had this transition to democratic rule not taken place, it is presumed that 
South Africa would have remained isolated from international trade structures and possibly 
even the WTO.400 Now that the political transformation has taken place, Erasmus says that 
‘active participation in the activities of the multilateral WTO is very much part of the policies 
and actions of the new South Africa’.401 
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When South Africa joined the WTO, it became party to WTO Agreements.402 It is also an 
active member of the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC).403 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa provides a framework for the 
conclusion of international treaties in their legal framework. Section 231 of the Constitution 
holds that international agreements are binding to the country only after they have been 
approved by resolution of the National Assembly.404 The South African Constitution also 
explicitly states that when interpreting domestic laws, international agreements should be used 
as reference and guidelines.405 This case study, in particular, examines the development of 
South Africa’s citrus exports under the AoA as an example of the country’s participation in the 
WTO. 
It is trite to point out that the South African government views the Doha Round as an 
opportunity for fundamental and structural changes to the development model of international 
trade.406 There are a number of specific issues that are important to South Africa, one of which 
is agriculture. South Africa believes that negotiations on agriculture should be tailored to 
incorporate structural changes and the distribution of agricultural production in the world 
economy as a whole.407 This case study will examine the agriculture export trade profiles of 
South Africa which fall under the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. The main 
objective is to give a practical example of South Africa’s participation in the WTO, with 
specific focus on the application of SPS measures. 
In the agriculture sector, most South African exports are destined for either the European Union 
(EU) or other African countries.408 Agriculture exports are quite complex; in particular, for the 
EU, any market access gains are likely to be negotiated under the Trade and Development 
Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) instead of multilateral agreements.409 What is ironic is that 
multilateral agreements that improve conditions for EU market access are likely to reduce 
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South African preferential access conditions and would therefore have very little value for 
South Africa.410 
The country is one of the largest citrus exporters in Africa, which accounts for more than 
25 percent of the global trade, and half of its citrus is exported to the EU.411 This makes the 
citrus exports the largest under the agriculture sector. Furthermore, the local South African 
citrus industry has 1 600 growers with 120 000 people in their employ to push production. It 
exports about 1,5 million tons of citrus a year.412 
Both South Africa and the EU are signatories to the SPS Agreement as well as the International 
Plant Protection Centre (IPPC),413 which secures the common and effective international action 
to prevent the spread pests affecting plants and plant products. The IPPC works in conjunction 
with the requirements under the SPS Agreement.414 In recent years, South Africa has faced 
stringent Citrus Black Spot (CBS) regulations imposed by the EU on the basis that it is an 
important phytosanitary requirement for citrus import permission.415 The EU had to impose 
this preliminary sanction, and it indicated that should South Africa exceed more than five 
allowable CBS interceptions, then this would subject the whole country to a ban. The primary 
reason for taking this measure was because CBS had not occurred in the EU and they therefore 
feared that the disease contained in the citrus exports would spread throughout the EU 
territory.416 
The impact of this has had negative economic implications for the South African citrus exports. 
This led the South African citrus industry in 2017 to suspend citrus fruit exports to the EU with 
immediate effect as a deliberate risk management step to ensure future exports to EU 
markets.417 The Citrus Growers’ Association listed direct and indirect costs associated with the 
EU measure, which include ‘spraying, replanting earlier than necessary, added inspection costs, 
and storage costs for impounded fruit at European ports’.418 With this being the largest export 
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sector, Phakathi holds that ‘the loss may include both permanent and seasonal employment in 
the sector and may cost the country millions in revenue losses’.419 Because South Africa is a 
developing country, compliance with the regulations may be costly; however, non-compliance 
will have bigger ramifications. Unfortunately, unlike the EU, South African agricultural 
producers do not receive direct support from the government, and this will aggravate the impact 
of the ban imposed.420 
4.6.3 Zambian honey exports 
Zambia is a member of the WTO and is also signatory to its Agreements as a consequence, but 
as an LDC, it encounters great difficulties in its participation in international trade 
negotiations.421 Despite Zambia’s constraints on participation in the WTO, it receives support 
from donors and international agencies which had advanced it to a more reformed policy-
making system and institutions.422 The Zambian Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry is 
the body responsible for formulating and conducting trade policy.423 Because the Zambian 
economy is heavily dominated by copper exports, the Zambian government tries to diversify 
their exports by prioritising other products such as honey, cotton and aluminium wires.424 
Beekeeping in Zambia has been one of the prominent income-generating activities for 
centuries, and this can be attributed to the favourable nature and climate.425 It plays a crucial 
role for Zambian forestry and agriculture. As such, the country is quite popular for its honey 
production, which has been certified organic because of the climate conditions and the 
traditional processing and harvesting methods used by the beekeepers.426 There are several 
ways in which beekeeping can be processed to produce honey in Zambia. Some of these 
include, ‘produce table honey and industrial honey that are often used by bakeries and food 
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processors; propolis which is used as natural medicine; beeswax for candles; and floor polish 
and honey beer which can be extracted from honey comb’.427 
Zambia is an approved honey exporter to different countries such as the UK, Belgium, the US, 
France, Botswana, Italy, and South Africa.428 For the purpose of this research, focus will be 
only on exports to the EU (which has a differential developmental status from Zambia) and 
South Africa (which is a developing country). Since Zambia falls under the group of LDCs, 
the duty on its exports is abolished, provided the Zambian exporter can provide the EU importer 
with a certificate of origin which proves that the honey is wholly obtained in Zambia and it is 
accompanied by a health certificate.429 The SPS Agreement of the WTO also comes into play 
here in order to protect domestic animal and plant health and food safety.430 Because honey is 
an animal product, it is subject to more stringent rules by EU importers.431 Member countries 
are allowed to set their own standards on the products they are importing with the condition 
that these standards are scientifically justifiable.432 
For Zambian honey exporters, compliance with SPS standards is not entirely compulsory.433 
This is because beekeepers in sub-Saharan Africa enjoy a level of competitive advantage of 
not having to make use of antibiotics and other such drugs for their bees as their bee population 
is not exposed to diseases and predators.434 On the contrary, however, it is a prerequisite to 
fulfil EU SPS regulations to gain access to their markets. Fortunately for Zambia, as with most 
sub-Saharan Africa, beekeepers enjoy a competitive advantage of no diseases and predators.435 
This puts the EU markets at ease of any risk. 
Similarly to the EU, Zambia also exports honey to South Africa, but it has not been smooth 
sailing as with the EU. Relevant to the discussion is that South Africa and Zambia are 
signatories of the WTO SPS Agreement and the IPPC.436 Interestingly, Zambian honey exports 
to South Africa are subject to a condition executed by the South African border control that the 
honey first be irradiated.437 This was after South Africa alleged that Zambian honey carried a 
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pest called the American Foulbrood (AFB).438 South Africa was adamant that non-irradiated 
Zambian honey may not be exported to South Africa, despite Zambia denying the allegations 
on the basis that no AFB has been found in Zambia.439 For Zambia, the problem with irradiating 
its honey is that loses its organic status and this constitutes a major trade barrier for Zambia. 
Finding a solution is even a bigger challenge for these WTO Members as Mwanza et al points 
out that due to ‘the lack of financial, organisational and human capacity, the time-consuming 
process of the WTO dispute settlement mechanisms and the complexity of the WTO rules’440 
are the primary reason why developing countries do not make use of the multilateral dispute 
settlement mechanisms put in place.441  
4.7 AID FOR TRADE  
Considering all the problems faced by developing countries insofar as trying to have beneficial 
participation in the multilateral trading system and finally achieving development, the WTO 
came to a realisation that there has to be global financial support offered to developing 
countries. At the 2005 Ministerial Conference hosted in Hong Kong, the WTO launched the 
Aid for Trade (AfT) initiative which is intended to provide global financial support to 
developing countries and LDCs.442 This Ministerial Conference provided a platform for further 
development of AfT. Paragraph 57 of the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration declares that: 
‘Aid for Trade should aim to help developing countries, particularly LDCs, to build the supply-
side capacity and trade related infrastructure that they need to assist them to implement and 
benefit from WTO Agreements and more broadly to expand their trade. Aid for Trade cannot 
be a substitute for the development benefits that will result from a successful conclusion to the 
DDA’. 
AfT is considered as an important instrument that will be used to aid trade and development 
and to do this, it encompasses a number of categories to achieve its goal. These include ‘more 
trade-oriented infrastructure, an improved production capacity, and by supporting negotiations 
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concerning trade policy regulation and trade liberalisation.’443 To ensure that developing 
countries reap these benefits, the core purpose of AfT is to help developing countries to: 
(i) Increase their trade in goods and services; 
(ii) Integrate into the multilateral trading system, and 
(iii) Benefit from liberalised trade and increased market access.444 
According to Karingi and Fabbroni, there is still much confusion about what AfT really is, 
what it entails, how it will work, and how it will be financed.445 Dube raises a concern stating 
that ‘since AfT is a donor initiative and is currently funded by international financial 
institutions and multilateral agencies, concerns do arise as to its effectiveness for development 
purposes’.446 However, to clear any confusion, Page holds that the best way to understand AfT 
is to differentiate between aid for costs related to the WTO and aid that is required to help 
countries develop.447 
4.8 CONCLUSION 
Development forms an integral part of the global trading system and with there being a 
development crisis within the system, it is left to the WTO to prioritise it even further. There 
has to be a more holistic application when approaching development; in that way the loopholes 
will decrease significantly. Had this been a set priority from the start and had the WTO had an 
effective plan of action in terms of their approach to development, neither the SDT nor the 
DDA would have been deadlocked.   
This chapter has shown how the WTO attempted to enhance development through the DDA. 
There has to be an alternative way in which the WTO approaches development without only 
associating it to economic growth, or every other round of negotiations will be used to fill in 
the blanks of the round that came before it and that will be a futile exercise. There is still an 
extremely long road to development and it is important for the WTO to make the development 
project their priority and approach it from a developing countries perspective. 
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CHAPTER FIVE:  
FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
There is an imbalance that exists between developing countries and developed countries in the 
multilateral trading system which leads to the benefits of trade being in favour of developed 
countries. In recognition of this, the WTO takes initiative by providing SDT provisions for 
developing countries as an attempt to somewhat give them an advantage in the multilateral 
trading system to enable them to complete with developed countries. The title of this thesis is 
‘Special and Differential Treatment Provisions within the World Trade Organization: The 
Pursuit of Development for Developing Countries’; thus the purpose of the research was to 
identify whether there is a fundamental problem insofar as the implementation of SDT is 
concerned; and if so, it seeks to recommend alternate ways to make the concept more tangible 
and beneficial for developing countries.  
5.2 FINDINGS 
SDT provisions are promoted as the primary objective to achieve development for developing 
countries. After extensively reviewing the history of the GATT/WTO through to the 
establishment of the SDT, it was identified that SDT as it currently stands is weak and 
ineffective. The research sought to analyse the primary objectives of the WTO which lie in the 
removal of barriers to trade and regulation of international trade and of importance the extent 
to which these objectives improve market access for developing countries.  
In answering this question, the research focused on the historic development of the 
international trading system from the establishment of the GATT right through to the birth of 
the WTO. It established that historical events of an economic and political nature have shaped 
and continue to shape the current structure of the multilateral trading system  
The research in chapter two established that although SDT was later adopted to remedy the 
discrepancies between developing and developed countries, the basic rationale behind it dates 
back to the era of the GATT. Its basic principles of the Most Favoured Nation, National 
Treatment and Reciprocity which were not entirely formally referred to in the agreement was, 
however, intended, and was structured to promote trade between equals, which subsequently 
excluded developing countries. Seeing that developing countries could not keep up with these 
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principles, the research identified that a mechanism such as the Generalised System of 
Preferences (GSP) was used to differentiate developing countries from developed countries by 
exempting developing countries from complying with GATT principles and by developed 
countries giving them trade preferences.448 Interestingly, it was found that the success was short 
lived or at the very worst non-existent, as GSPs were granted voluntarily and at the discretion 
of developed countries and therefore not implemented effectively. One would think that before 
the establishment of SDT provisions, the WTO would have realised that non-binding trade 
preference provisions are not at all effective. They are unstable, and history shows that they 
deny developing countries a solid basis to participate in the multilateral trading system.  
Furthermore, it was found that as developing countries were not key participants in the 
multilateral trading system, the GATT adopted the Enabling Clause, which was another 
exception that favoured developing countries in the multilateral trading system as it enabled 
developing countries to receive preferential market access from developed countries.449 
However, like the GSPs, the Enabling Clause gave developed countries wide discretionary 
powers to decide on whether or not they would like to make use of the of the system of granting 
preferential market access to developing countries.450 This again contributed to the instability 
of developing countries’ growth and development and strengthened the gap that exists between 
them. 
Notably, multilateral trading has undergone significant changes since GATT was established 
in 1947 up to the last round of trade negotiations under the GATT, which was the Uruguay 
Round, and which led to the establishment of the WTO. Within this context, the research aimed 
to determine the extent to which the objectives of the WTO benefit developing countries, noting 
the many positive changes in the multilateral trading regime with regard to developing 
countries. 
 As such, to remedy the exclusion of developing countries’ participation under the GATT, the 
WTO’s ingenious Single Undertaking effectively meant that developing countries had to accept 
the main rules of the GATT/WTO despite having been previously sidelined.451 Similarly to the 
GATT, the provisions and the main objectives of the WTO insofar as developing countries are 
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concerned are to assist them on ‘trade policy issues through technical assistance and 
cooperating with other international organizations’.452 
As such, chapter three examined the extent in which these objectives are compatible with the 
structure of SDT provisions. This research has identified that there is a fundamental problem 
with the implementation of SDT provisions for developing countries. When looking into the 
history of SDT provisions, the research found that there is an inherent conflict between WTO 
and SDT, which was introduced as a compromise as the WTO evolved. Notwithstanding the 
Preamble of the GATT 1947 and later the WTO recognising the need to raise living standards 
and ensure full employment through reciprocal free trade, it was clear that developing countries 
was not a priority as the GATT regulated non-discriminatory trade among equals, these being 
developed countries. This in essence caused a conflict between the WTO and the interests of 
developing countries through SDT  
Furthermore, another major problem identified with the SDT is the use of the uncertain and 
nugatory language of the provisions. The language used is suggestive, not prescriptive, which 
allows room for developed countries not to adhere to them as they do not create a mandatory 
legal obligation. It is therefore essential that the possibility of strengthening the content of SDT 
provisions be investigated and strictly attended to by the Committee on Trade and Development 
and the WTO as a whole. In a meeting held in April 2017, the Committee on Trade and 
Development declared their intention to reduce inequality as a necessary step to ensuring long-
term economic growth and development.453 Much of how this is intended to be done is not 
clear. However,  it involves reduction of poverty more than it does the promotion of 
development to make trading more beneficial for developing countries.  
The research identified the primary function and purpose of SDT which is to ‘cure’ the 
economic vulnerabilities and trade inequalities experienced by developing and least-developed 
countries. In order to do this, the interests of developing countries must be upheld. However, 
this must not be to the exclusion of developed countries’ interests, which has been a major 
stumbling block. . Intrinsically, the research looked into whether the interests of both 
developing and least-developed countries are being upheld in the application of SDT provisions 
and whether there is a way in which SDT can be effectuated in order to ensure that developing 
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countries reap the benefits of the multilateral trading system. Ultimately, the research showed 
that the failure by the WTO to define developing countries and their exact needs makes 
upholding their interests futile. Even though the WTO requires the application of SDT 
provisions to be consistent with its development objectives, this research found that SDT 
cannot do this while at the same time upholding developing countries’ interests. This is because 
there are different needs and interests among different developing countries, and applying SDT 
provisions similarly becomes unsubstantial and this will remain so until there is a considerable 
evaluation of the special needs of developing countries. 
Development is sought to be achieved by the WTO through the SDT and to balance the 
interaction between developing and developed countries. SDT is intended to level the playing 
fields between developed and developing countries, but it becomes incapable of producing any 
useful results because the developing countries themselves are not at an equal level. 
Considering the primary objectives of the WTO, it is not sufficient for a few developing 
countries to thrive while the rest are lurking in the shadows. 
After an analysis of the SDT provisions, Brennan found that they contribute to the inferior 
treatment of developing countries, and the direct consequence of this is failure by developing 
countries to increase their international trade with other countries.454 She suggests that the SDT 
provisions be reformulated in a way that discourages protectionism by developed countries and 
delays the emergence of developing counties into the multilateral trading system.455 However, 
Brennan cautions that despite the reform, developed countries would still find a way to abuse 
the reformed SDT mechanism for their self-serving purposes.456 This comes as no surprise, and 
thus research found that the interests of developed countries are held at a much higher level 
than those of developing countries. The impact of this has even granted developed countries 
the ability to re-model development mechanisms to benefit themselves more.  
Against this background, the research in chapter three then sought to understand how the SDT 
is implemented, by an analysis of the SPS and TBT agreements.457 As noted in the relevant 
chapter, the SPS agreement regulates the imposition of health safety requirements on imported 
plant and animal products458 and allows countries to impose health standards necessary for the 
protection of human, animal and plant life, provided these measures do not impose restrictions 
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on international trade. Of concern was the fact that developing countries are finding the 
implementation of this agreement expensive. For this reason, SDT provisions exist to ensure 
that developing countries’ needs are catered for insofar as implementation boundaries are 
concerned. Further, in respect of the TBT Agreement, which ensures that there are no 
unnecessary impediments to trade caused by technical regulations, standards and procedures 
for assessment of conformity,459 it was again found that developing countries experienced some 
difficulties with implementation, and SDT is used to try cure this problem.  
Ultimately, in both agreements, there is an acknowledgment of the developmental gap that 
exists between developing and developed countries and the SDT framework therefore grants 
developing countries special provisions. These agreements also contain undertakings 
concerning technical assistance in an attempt to take the interests of developing countries into 
consideration.460 However, the scepticism of developing countries and the non-binding nature 
of the SDT provisions worsens the lack of implementation of the provisions. 
The shortcomings of the SDT provisions and issues of development are known to the WTO, 
and therefore this research looked into recent attempts to address these challenges. In 
recognition of the development issues faced by developing countries, the current WTO 
Ministerial Conference launched in Doha in 2001 had development as its main focal point. The 
Doha Round is still ongoing so there is no set outcome on how developing countries’ interests 
will be attended to. Trying to resolve these problems may be challenging because the current 
inequalities in the multilateral trading system stem from the pre-Uruguay era and possibly even 
before that. In fact, the issues and the inability to resolve them are also a result of the exclusion 
of developing countries from the multilateral trading system from the very beginning. Even 
when developing countries were finally incorporated into international trade, the WTO 
procedures still displayed a strong bias towards developed countries. 
The rebranding of the Doha Round as the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) displayed a 
greater understanding of the needs and difficulties faced by developing countries as well as 
putting much-deserved weight on developmental issues. However, despite this, there is still a 
deficit in understanding what exactly developing countries need. The DDA also pursued the 
strengthening of SDT provisions as they could not be isolated from development, and that being 
their aim, the also focused on the Doha mandate plan on improving SDT provisions for 
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developing countries by making them more, effective and operational, and most importantly, 
making them mandatory. Thus far, many proposals have been tabled in order to bring the Doha 
Round to a fruitful conclusion, but with no success, as the round is still ongoing, and the last 
meeting was held in 2015 in Nairobi in Kenya. 
Interesting developments under the Doha Round include the Trade Facilitation Agreement 
(TFA), which shows significant progress in the structure and content of international trade 
agreements, and which was a product of the Bali Ministerial Conference under the mandate of 
the DDA. This was an important development as part of the DDA objectives is to remove any 
obstacles to trade. It was established that developing countries still find it challenging to keep 
up with our rapidly changing economic and technological world, and therefore the TFA was 
necessary in making the cross-border system more advanced in order to ensure accessibility 
and effectiveness. As such, the positive aspect of this is that international trade will therefore 
be much smoother.  
The research found it of relevance that there is indeed a section in this agreement that deals 
specifically with SDT provisions in order for developing countries and LDCs to have fewer 
difficulties in implementing the agreement. It is applicable to signatories only, and contains 
legally binding obligations which are seen in the use of clear, concise, and obligatory language. 
This is a significant milestone by drafters of international trade agreements and reduces the 
chances of shortfalls in implementation as seen with many agreement provisions. The fact that 
the DDA is yet to be concluded is evidence of how many problems need solving in the 
multilateral trading system, especially where developing countries are concerned. Not even the 
Nairobi Ministerial Conference of 2015 marked the end of the DDA. Because of the inability 
to bring the DDA to a close, a new approach was adopted during this round, but unfortunately 
it was contradictory and moved slightly away from the DDA mandate. However, those in 
charge managed to salvage the problem. It was suggested that further trade liberalisation was 
needed in order to better reach the goals of the DDA.  
In an attempt to measure whether or not the challenges faced by developing countries were 
being attended to, this research conducted a case study on Kenya, South Africa and Zambia to 
get a clearer picture of how these developing countries are incorporated into the WTO and how 
beneficial their participation is. It focused primarily on their trade with developed countries 
because that is where the major gap lies. In applying the SPS and TBT agreements to the case 
studies, it identified that although the SPS measures did not cause unnecessary obstacles to 
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trade, the exporter developing countries and LDCs still struggled with compliance because it 
has cost implications. However, SDT makes provision for longer time-frames to comply with 
provisions of the Agreements. It is the opinion of this paper that although these longer time-
frames are helpful, they are not the best way to achieve trade and development. The main reason 
is that the world of trade is rapidly changing, and countries have to keep up with the fast-
changing demands. This causes a conflict between keeping up with quick revolving demands 
and taking longer to comply with certain longstanding demands. 
Despite the notable objectives of helping developing countries to exploit trade opportunities 
effectively, this has been an inefficient approach. Thus another approach to help developing 
countries address their development concerns is through the use of AfT. Ideally, in the context 
of international trade, trade instead of aid should be the best way to achieve development. 
However, given the non-coherent gap between developing and developed countries and the 
approach the WTO takes with SDT, this has not been the case. Therefore, this research proposes 
in chapter five that the best way to address development concerns appears to be to use AfT. 
In summation of the findings, the WTO must improve market access objectives for developing 
countries, but SDT does not allow this to happen. Although the objectives of both the WTO 
and SDT include development, the outcome of things in the multilateral trading system shows 
quite the opposite. SDT provisions seem to promote market access only in developed countries 
and prioritise protectionism in developing countries. Practically speaking, this seems like an 
ideal setup. It actually is not. The main goal is development, and realising it has been 
stagnating. Therefore, a number of things have to be modified in order to best effectuate SDT 
so that developing countries can enjoy benefits of the multilateral trading system. 
Having identified the various findings, the research now has the difficult task of offering certain 
recommendations. 
5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the shortcomings identified above, this thesis presents a number of recommendations. 
It is the opinion of this thesis that the basic starting point for any discourse on finding a probable 
solution is to define every single element necessary to achieve development in order to give it 
more context. The approach of fuelling development through SDT is inefficient and not 
substantial; hence there have been a number of inconsistencies in the system.  
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First, there is an urgent need to strengthen the concept for a more progressive and harmonised 
approach of SDT, and this thesis holds that for this to be done, it is imperative for the WTO to 
define fully and extensively what a developing country is. This should go with the 
acknowledgment that no two developing countries are the same, and therefore their needs and 
interests are different. Apart from looking at the GDP, in terms of needs and interests, research 
shows that a developing country is one that has needs that a developed country does not have 
or is not entitled to have, but the scope and ambit of these needs are not described. The closest 
the WTO has come to defining these needs is by describing them as ‘development, financial 
and trade needs of developing countries’.461 This definition is lacking in meaning and it does 
not come close to being a correct representation of developing countries’ needs. The use of the 
word ‘development’ to define special needs is redundant when these special needs are required 
to achieve development.  
This thesis therefore recommends that the needs and interests of developing countries should 
be put into various classes, instead of applying a ‘one size fits all’ approach, because it is devoid 
of meaning and far from reality. Further, applying rules equally on an unequal situation does 
not produce equal results. This is because developing countries are at different economic, 
financial and technological stages which then varies their capacity to fulfil their multilateral 
trade obligations.  
Once the needs of developing countries are identified and classified, Hynes and Lammersen 
suggest that focus should also be on identifying and tackling the most binding constraints faced 
by developing countries. Once that is done, the constraints that have the biggest impact on 
expanding trade and promoting development should be addressed first.462 The research aligns 
itself with this recommendation, which involves identifying a method to diagnose and resolve 
these constraints; and therefore suggests consultations with relevant parties to pinpoint the 
trade needs and constraints that prevent developing countries from expanding trade and 
achieving development.463 
It is also critical that the issues within the SDT be revised since they have not done much in 
the way of fully integrating developing countries into the multilateral trading system. This is 
not to say they have not done anything at all, but they have not done enough to ensure that 
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developing countries are on a secure footing to attain and sustain economic growth and 
development. Brennan recommends, which this thesis agrees with, that the practice of 
developed countries not adhering to obligations should come to an end and that there should 
be reformulation of the various provisions, resulting in a clear understanding of which 
provisions are binding or non-binding on developed countries.464 The Doha mandate of making 
the SDT provisions mandatory is a step forward, but what is more important is imposing some 
form of legal sanctions on the failure to oblige. This is suggested in the hopes that developed 
countries will actually support and adhere to SDT provisions.  
In respect of compliance with the SPS and TBT agreements and their contribution to 
development, Adibe believes that they place a heavier burden on the developing countries.465 
This research found, in chapter four, that when developing countries trade with developed 
countries, especially as exporters, there is a strong likelihood that the developed country has to 
comply with standards set by developed countries and this will have major cost implications 
as a consequence of compliance. It is obvious that the cost of compliance for developed 
countries is then much lower, which aggravates the already existing gulf of development and 
trade imbalance between developing and developed countries. The research agrees with 
Adibe’s recommendation that to ameliorate the effects that these agreements have on 
developing countries, SDT provisions in both agreements should be reinforced in a way that 
gives special consideration to different needs of developing countries standards. This highlights 
the point made of classifying developing countries in accordance to their needs, which will 
make fulfilling them a lot easier.  
The need to change the approach of the SDT can lead to a form of SDT contained in AfT which 
will enhance a stronger multilateral trading system. AfT is the perfect fit as it is meant to assist 
developing countries with implementing trade agreements as well as benefiting from trade 
opportunities. However, like any other aspect of the WTO, implementation and achieving 
desired results will not be an easy task.  
On identifying that AfT is an effective measure by means of which the WTO can achieve 
development for developing countries, there are a number of factors that need careful attention 
to ensure they do not fall short in implementation. Although SDT and AfT are not one and the 
same thing, it is recommended that the two never be looked at in isolation because they 
                                                          
464 Note 189 above at 160. 
465 Note 287 above at 133. 
88 
 
ultimately have the same objectives under the WTO of enhancing trade and development for 
developing countries. This research showed that the SDT as it currently stands does not fulfil 
its objectives due to its shortfalls in implementation and it is therefore suggested that it be 
altered in a way that is coherent with the scope and ambit of AfT. The main and most important 
objective this suggestion is trying to improve development for developing countries. This will 
also allow the WTO to achieve push towards its fundamental mandate while at the same time 
adhering to the needs of both developed and developing country members. 
Special attention should be paid to how AfT will enhance development and improve the work 
of SDT. Trade liberalisation should also be a part of reaching the development goals. Although 
opening markets has been a controversial subject, if done under the spectrum of AfT, that 
should determine the extent to which trade liberalisation should take place. If this is done 
accurately, it will strengthen the position of developing countries in the multilateral trading 
system. 
As such, Ijjo and Shinyekwa believe that aid can boost trade. However, they recommend that 
aid should not be used as a ‘substitute for domestic resource mobilisation to finance increased 
control over production conditions, especially in terms of production technology and quality 
and standards capability’.466 When translating this to fit the case studies conducted in this 
research, Kenya, South Africa and Zambia should use the aid as a way to support their trade 
development efforts. It is recommended that the aid should merely supplement the needs of 
these countries to help with trade and development and not as a substitute of the work already 
done. In their trade policies, these countries should ensure that the conditions for aid are 
effective and that they eliminate possible corruption and mismanagement as a result of the aid. 
Hence Nunn and Qian warn that aid can indeed be detrimental without accountable 
governance.467 
Based on the discussion in chapter four, that the AfT becomes instrumental may be one of the 
most important steps in achieving development and improving the status quo of SDT. Owing 
to the fact that the outcome and conclusion of the DDA is still in the air, it is imperative that 
the WTO further prioritises discussions on AfT to avoid any future failures in its 
implementation and operation. Kaufmann and Grosz suggest that the DDA should no longer 
be used as an instrument to overcome the shortcomings of the Uruguay round; instead it is 
                                                          
466 Note 442 above at 46.  
467 N Nunn & N Qian Aiding Conflict: The Impact of the US Food Aid on Civil War National Bureau of Economic 
Research Working Paper 17794 (2012) 28. 
89 
 
important for the issues relating to economic growth and development to be discussed and 
researched, and suitable resolutions reached.468 Hence this thesis suggests that the combined 
work of both SDT and AfT be looked at extensively and be used as a joint tool to achieve 
development goals of the WTO. 
Unfortunately, the master plan under the Doha Round and its development agenda was to 
succeed in addressing the trade and development concerns of developed countries, which did 
not materialise. Garcia recommends that there be a whole new focus for the trade and 
development policy under the WTO, which should be built on fairness.469 There is no doubt 
that SDT on its own is not enough to support developing countries in their pursuit of 
development. Hence this thesis has extensively recommended the use of AfT as a form of a 
development aid. In conclusion, once all the loopholes within the system of reaching 
development goals for developing countries are reviewed and adhered to, only then can 
development be fully realised. If not, then the development agenda as well as the fate of 
developing countries will remain elusive.  
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GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE 
Article I of GATT 1947: General Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment provides as follows: 
‘1. With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with 
importation or exportation or imposed on the international transfer of payments for imports or 
exports, and with respect to the method of levying such duties and charges, and with respect 
to all rules and formalities in connection with importation and exportation, and with respect 
to all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III, any advantage, favour, privilege 
or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for 
any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product 
originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.’ 
 
Article III of GATT 1947: National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation 
provides as follows: 
‘1. The contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and other internal charges, and laws, 
regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, 
transportation, distribution or use of products, and internal quantitative regulations requiring 
the mixture, processing or use of products in specified amounts or proportions, should not be 
applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic production. 
 
‘2. The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other 
contracting party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal 
charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products. 
Moreover, no contracting party shall otherwise apply internal taxes or other internal charges to 
imported or domestic products in a manner contrary to the principles set forth in paragraph 1.’ 
 
AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 
Agreement of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
Definition 1: ‘Sanitary or phytosanitary measure’: ‘Any measure applied: (a) to protect animal or 
plant life or health within the territory of the Member from risks arising from the entry, establishment 
or spread of pests, diseases, disease carrying organisms or disease-causing organisms; (b) to protect 
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human or animal life or health within the territory of the Member from risks arising from additives, 
contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in foods, beverages or feedstuffs; (c) to protect 
human life or health within the territory of the Member from risks arising from diseases carried by 
animals, plants or products thereof, or from the entry, establishment or spread of pests; or (d) to 
prevent or limit other damage within the territory of the Member from the entry, establishment or 
spread of pests.’ 
Article 9: Technical Assistance 1: ‘Members agree to facilitate the provision of technical assistance 
to other Members, especially developing country Members, either bilaterally or through the 
appropriate international organisations. Such assistance may be, inter alia, in the areas of processing 
technologies, research and infrastructure, including in the establishment of national regulatory bodies, 
and may take the form of advice, credits, donations and grants, including for the purpose of seeking 
technical expertise, training and equipment to allow such countries.’ 
Article 9. 2: ‘Where substantial investments are required in order for an exporting developing country 
Member to fulfil the sanitary or phytosanitary requirements of an importing Member, the latter shall 
consider providing such technical assistance as will permit the developing country Member to maintain 
and expand its market access opportunities for the product involved.’ 
Article 10: Special and Differential Treatment 1: ‘In the preparation and application of sanitary or 
phytosanitary measures, Members shall take account of the special needs of developing country 
Members, and in particular of the least-developed country Members.’ 
Article 10.2: ‘Where the appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection allows scope for the 
phased introduction of new sanitary or phytosanitary measures, longer time-frames for compliance 
should be accorded on products of interest to developing country Members so as to maintain 
opportunities for their exports.’ 
Article 10 3: ‘With a view to ensuring that developing country Members are able to comply with the 
provisions of this Agreement, the Committee is enabled to grant to such countries, upon request, 
specified, time-limited exceptions in whole or in part from obligations under this Agreement, taking 
into account their financial, trade and development needs.’ 
Article 10.4: ‘Members should encourage and facilitate the active participation of developing country 
Members in the relevant international organizations.’ 
Article 14: Final provisions: ‘The least-developed country Members may delay application of the 
provisions of this Agreement for a period of five years following the date of entry into force of the 
WTO Agreement with respect to their sanitary or phytosanitary measures affecting importation or 
imported products. Other developing country Members may delay application of the provisions of this 
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Agreement, other than paragraph 8 of Article 5 and Article 7, for two years following the date of entry 
into force of the WTO Agreement with respect to their existing sanitary or phytosanitary measures 
affecting importation or imported products, where such application is prevented by a lack of technical 
expertise, technical infrastructure or resources.’ 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
Article 12: Special and Differential Treatment of Developing Country Members  
Article 12.1: ‘Members shall provide differential and more favourable treatment to developing country 
Members to this Agreement, through the following provisions as well as through the relevant provisions 
of other Articles of this Agreement.’ 
Article 12.2: ‘Members shall give particular attention to the provisions of this Agreement concerning 
developing country Members rights and obligations and shall take into account the special development, 
financial and trade needs of developing country Members in the implementation of this Agreement, 
both nationally and in the operation of this Agreements institutional arrangements.’ 
Article 12.3: ‘Members shall, in the preparation and application of technical regulations, standards and 
conformity assessment procedures, take account of the special development, financial and trade needs 
of developing country Members, with a view to ensuring that such technical regulations, standards and 
conformity assessment procedures do not create unnecessary obstacles to exports from developing 
country Members.’ 
Article 12.4: ‘Members recognize that, although international standards, guides or recommendations 
may exist, in their particular technological and socio-economic conditions, developing country 
Members adopt certain technical regulations, standards or conformity assessment procedures aimed at 
preserving indigenous technology and production methods and processes compatible with their 
development needs. Members therefore recognize that developing country Members should not be 
expected to use international standards as a basis for their technical regulations or standards, including 
test methods, which are not appropriate to their development, financial and trade needs.’  
Article 12.5: ‘Members shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to them to ensure that 
international standardizing bodies and international systems for conformity assessment are organized 
and operated in a way which facilitates active and representative participation of relevant bodies in all 




Article 12.6: ‘Members shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to them to ensure that 
international standardizing bodies, upon request of developing country Members, examine the 
possibility of, and, if practicable, prepare international standards concerning products of special interest 
to developing country Members.’ 
Article 12.7: ‘Members shall, in accordance with the provisions of Article 11, provide technical 
assistance to developing country Members to ensure that the preparation and application of technical 
regulations, standards and conformity assessment procedures do not create unnecessary obstacles to the 
expansion and diversification of exports from developing country Members. In determining the terms 
and conditions of the technical assistance, account shall be taken of the stage of development of the 
requesting Members and in particular of the least-developed country Members.’  
Article 11: Technical Assistance to Other Members 
Article 11.1: ‘Members shall, if requested, advise other Members, especially the developing country 
Members, on the preparation of technical regulations.’ 
Article 12.8: ‘It is recognized that developing country Members may face special problems, including 
institutional and infrastructural problems, in the field of preparation and application of technical 
regulations, standards and conformity assessment procedures. It is further recognized that the special 
development and trade needs of developing country Members, as well as their stage of technological 
development, may hinder their ability to discharge fully their obligations under this Agreement. 
Members, therefore, shall take this fact fully into account. Accordingly, with a view to ensuring that 
developing country Members are able to comply with this Agreement, the Committee on Technical 
Barriers to Trade provided for in Article 13 (referred to in this Agreement as the “Committee”) is 
enabled to grant, upon request, specified, time-limited exceptions in whole or in part from obligations 
under this Agreement. When considering such requests, the Committee shall take into account the 
special problems, in the field of preparation and application of technical regulations, standards and 
conformity assessment procedures, and the special development and trade needs of the developing 
country Member, as well as its stage of technological development, which may hinder its ability to 
discharge fully its obligations under this Agreement. The Committee shall, in particular, take into 
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